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RETRIBUTION IN A MODERN PENAL LAW:
THE PRINCIPLE OF AGGRAVATED HARM
RoNALD J. ALLEN*
Surely to think of the apt expression of feeling-even if we call it
moral indignation rather than revenge-as the ultimate justification
of punishment is to subordinate what is primary to what is ancillary.
We do not live in society in order to condemn, though we may con-
demn in order to live.'
Thus the old Gentleman ended his Harangue. The... [Legislature]
heard it, and approved the Doctrine and immediately practised the
contrary, just as if it had been a common Sermon .... 2
I
O n September 1, 1967, in the State of New York, the "first major
and comprehensive revision of the Penal Law in the State of New
York since 1881"s became effective.4 While much has been written of
the revised Penal Law,5 one important aspect of it has received little
*Assistant Professor of Law, Faculty of Law and Jurisprudence, State University
of New York at Buffalo; B.S., Marshall University, 1970; J.D., University of Michigan,
1973.
1. H. L. A. HART, PUNISHMENT AND RESPONSIBILITY 172 (1968) (emphasis in
original).
2. B. Franklin, Preface to Poor Richard's Almanac, in THE AMERICAN TRADITION IN
LITERATURE 155 (3rd ed. 1967).
3. Governor's Memorandum of Approval, July 20, 1965, in MCKINNEY'S CON-
SOLIDATED LAWS OF Naw YORE ANNOTATED, bk. 39, Penal Law at xxxv (1967). Al-
though the Penal Law was passed by the Legislature and approved by the Governor in
1965 (N.Y. SEss. LAws 1965, ch. 1030), "[i]n order to allow the judiciary and the
legal fraternity and law enforcement agencies ample opportunity to study and familiarize
themselves with the new law, the "Revised Penal Law" was accorded an effective date
of September 1, 1967, more than two years subsequent to its enactment." Memorandum
of the Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code on the Penal
Law, id. at xxzd.
4. The revision of the Penal Law was largely the product of the New York Tempo-
rary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code. The Commission
was created by statute in 1961. N.Y. SEss. LAws 1961, ch. 346, amended by N.Y. SEss.
LAws 1962, ch. 548. For an account of the history and operation of the Commission, see
STATE OF NEW YoR TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE PENAL LAw AlN
CRIMINAL CODE: REPORTS 1962-1968, in particular, N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 41, at 5-19
(1962) and Memorandum of the Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Crim-
inal Code on the Penal Law, supra note 3.
5. Of general interest are: STATE OF NEW YORK TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON RE-
vIsIoN OF THE PENAL LAW AND CRIMINAL CODE: REPORTS 1962-1968, supra note 4;
Commission Staff Notes on the Proposed New York Penal Law, in PROPOSED PENAL
LAW: NEW YORx DRAFT 251 (Edward Thompson Co. ed. 1964); Symposium: New
York's New Penal Law, 18 BUFFALO L. REv. 211 (1968-1969); Gegan, Criminal Homi-
cide in the Revised N.Y. Penal Law, 12 N.Y.L.F. 566 (1966); McKenna, Survey of N.Y.
Law: Criminal Law and Procedure, 17 SYRAcuSE L. REv. 158 (1965) & 19 SYRACUSE
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attention. The drafters of the Penal Law, the State of New York Tem-
porary Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal Code,0
were charged7 to "reappraise, in light of current knowledge and think-
ing, existing substantive provisions relating to sentencing, the imposing
of penalties, and the theory of punishment relating to crime. '8 Al-
though the sentencing provisions of the Penal Law have been discussed
elsewhere, 9 the Commission's reappraisal of "the theory of punishment
relating to crime," and how well the Penal Law reflects that reap-
praisal, has gone virtually unnoticed.
In examining the old Penal Law,1
[t]he Commission found ... [it] ... to be anything but a cohesive,
well-organized unit, permeated as it is with inconsistencies, ambig-
uities, inequities and archaisms. Instead of a modem set of guidelines
to help effectuate the deterrence of crime and the segregation and
reformation of criminals, the State of New York has a few modem
procedures engrafted by amendment upon a structure designed for a
retributive system.
[S]eparate punishments were prescribed for each crime based upon an
evaluation of the amount of retribution society should exact for the
offense."
This, to the Commission, was intolerable. It believed that a penal
law retributively grounded ignores the tremendous expansion in knowl-
edge of the past century that has resulted in "a growing realization that
the sentencing of and confinement of convicted persons is not a simple
matter of making the guilty pay for their offenses .... "12 and runs
L. REv. 271 (1968); Ploscowe, Sex Offenses in the New Penal Law, 32 BROOKLyN L.
REv. 274 (1966); Sobel, The Anticipatory Offenses in the New Penal Law: Solicita-
tion, Conspiracy, Attempt and Facilitation, 32 BROOKLYN L. REv 257 (1966); Suvero,
Drug Offenses and the New Penal Law, 32 BROOxLYN L. REv. 287 (1966); Note, The
Proposed Penal Law of New York, 64 CoLu i. L. REv. 1469 (1964); Comment, Affirma-
tive Defenses Under New York's New Penal Law, 19 SYEAcusn L. REv. 44 (1967).
6. Hereinafter referred to as the Commission.
7. The act creating and charging the Commission was N.Y. SEss. LAws 1961, ch.
346, as amended by N.Y. SEss. LAWS 1962, ch. 548.
8. N.Y. SESS. LAwS 1961, ch. 346, as amended by N.Y. SEss. LAws 1962, ch. 548,
§ 2(d).
9. See note 5 supra; Murrahs & Rubin, Penal Reform and the Model Sentencing
Act, 65 COLUM%. L. REV. 1167 (1965).
10. The "old" Penal Law is the Penal Law of 1909, [1909] Laws of New York,
ch. 88.
11. STATE OF NEW YORK TEMPORARY COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE PENAL
LAW AND CRIMINAL CODE, INTERIM REPORT (February 1, 1963); N.Y. LEo. Doe. No. 8,
at 27 (1963).
12. STATE OF NEW YORK TEMPORARY COImissION ON REVISION OF THE PENAL




the grave risk of losing the confidence and respect of the populace.18
The Commission thus undertook as one of its primary tasks a "re-,
appraisal of certain fundamental concepts and philosophies lying at the
very roots of our penal system."' 4 According to the Commission, this
reappraisal resulted in "changes of a fundamental nature.., in order
to bring [the Penal Law] into step with modern sociological, psycho-
logical and penological thinking."'15
The "fundamental changes" the Commission thought it had
wrought in the Penal Law are summarized in the General Purposes
Article of the Penal Law16-in particular, section 1.05 (5) which reads:
The general purposes of the provisions of this chapter are:
5. To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of of-
fenses through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized,
the rehabilitation of those convicted, and their confinement when
required in the interests of public protection.
In short, the imposition of penal sanctions was to be justified on the
basis of deterrence, rehabilitation and incapacitation. Retribution was
rejected as a justification of punishment. 7
13. N.Y. LEG. Doc. No. 41, at 7-8.
14. Id. at 8.
15. Memorandum of the Commission on Revision of the Penal Law and Criminal
Code on the Penal Law, supra note 3, at xxxii.
16. N.Y. PENAL LAw §§ 1.00-.05 (McKinney 1975).
17. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1.05 (McKinney 1975) reads in its entirety:§ 1.05 General Purposes.
The general purposes of the provisions of this chapter are:
1. To proscribe conduct which unjustifiably and inexcusably causes or
threatens substantial harm to individual or public interests;
2. To give fair warning of the nature of the conduct proscribed and of
the sentences authorized upon conviction;
3. To define the act or omission and the accompanying mental state
which constitute each offense;
4. To differentiate on reasonable grounds between serious and minor of-
fenses and to prescribe proportionate penalties therefor; and
5. To insure the public safety by preventing the commission of offenses
through the deterrent influence of the sentences authorized, the rehabilitation
of those convicted, and their confinement when required in the interests of
public protection.
In discussions of the "purpose" or "justification" of a penal law or sanction, it must
be borne in mind that "the problem . . . is one of the priority and relationship of pur-
poses as well as of their legitimacy-of multivalued rather than single-valued thinking."
Hart, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAw & CONTEMP. PROB. 401 (1958). For
example, § 1.05 contains three distinct components, each of which can be further re-
duced to the elements that comprise that particular component. The purpose of the
first component consisting of §§ 1.05(1),(2) (the first clause), and (3), is "[t]o an-
nounce to society that these actions are not to be done and to secure that fewer of them
are done." H. L. A. HART, supra note 1, at 6. The purpose of the second component of
§ 1.05, consisting of § 1.05(2) (the second clause), and (4) is to state what will be
1975]
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Unfortunately, one cannot stop at this point,' confident that all
done to those who commit a proscribed act-they will receive an appropriate penalty.
The purpose of the third component, consisting of § 1.05(5) is to justify the second;
thus it is here that the question of justification of punishment is presented.
Furthermore, in discussing the justification of punishment, as Professor Hart has
demonstrated so forcefully, one must distinguish the justification of a practice from the
justification of the application of that practice in any particular case. This, of course, is
Professor Hart's well known General Justifying Aim/Distribution terminology. See
H. L. A. HART, id. at 8-13. Thus, it is not at all inconsistent to recognize that retribu-
tion may play a role in the distribution of punishment, e.g., limiting punishment to an
offender for his offense, see note 32 infra, notwithstanding that it is not relied on to
justify the practice of punishment. Section 1.05(5)'s thrust seems to be directed toward
denying retribution as a justification of the practice of punishment, and I will assume
that to be the case for purposes of this article.
18. Examples of § 1.05 being taken at face value are not hard to find, although
no purpose would be served by citing them. The process may have received its impetus
from the Commission, in fact. In the Commission Staff Notes on the Proposed New
York Penal Law, supra note 5, at 251, the Commission states that the purpose of the
notes are to explain "major changes which would be effected by the proposed Penal
Law . . . . " It is certainly not unreasonable to suppose, given the Commission's stated
view on the retributive aspects of the old Penal Law, that it would think that § 1.05
contained "major changes" from the old Penal Law. See notes 10-15 supra & accom-
panying text. Yet, all the staff notes say of the section is that it "serves . . . to state, in
broad terms, the salutory objectives . . . (the Penal Law) seeks to achieve . . . ." Com-
mission Staff Notes on the Proposed New York Penal Law, supra note 5, at 251. Not
everyone has accepted this section at face value, however. See the discriminating anal-
ysis of the Penal Law in Note, supra note 5. See also Murrahs & Rubin, supra note 9.
The New York courts have done as badly as the Commission-there has been
no thorough discussion of the justification of penal sanctions by any New York court,
either before or after the effective date of the present Penal Law, although quite a
number of decisions touch on the topic. The leading case is People v. Oliver, 1 N.Y.2d
152, 134 N.E.2d 197, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1956), where the court of appeals held that
N.Y. Session Laws 1948, ch. 544, amending § 486 of the 1909 Penal Law (which
had the effect of raising the age of competency from seven years to sixteen years, except
for a fifteen year old who commits an act punishable by death or life imprisonment)
was to be applied in all cases decided after the effective date of the enactment. In
discussing the problem the court said:
This application of statutes reducing punishment accords with the best modem
theories concerning the functions of punishment in criminal law. According
to these theories, the punishment or treatment of criminal offenders is directed
toward one or more of three ends: (1) to discourage and act as a deterrent
upon future criminal activity, (2) to confine the offender so that he may not
harm society and (3) to correct and rehabilitate the offender. There is no place
in the scheme for punishment for its own sake, the product simply of vengeance
or retribution.... A legislative mitigation of the penalty for a particular crime
represents a legislative judgment that the lesser penalty or the different treat-
ment is sufficient to meet the legitimate ends of the criminal law. Nothing is
to be gained by imposing the more severe penalty after such a pronouncement;
the excess in punishment can, by hypothesis, serve no purpose other than to
satisfy a desire for vengeance.
Id. at 160, 134 N.E.2d at 201-02, 151 N.Y.S.2d at 373.
Many decisions have echoed this language, but not one has elaborated. See, e.g.,
People v. Warden, 30 App. Div. 2d 649, 291 N.Y.S.2d 200 (1st Dep't 1968); People v.
Mosher, 24 App. Div. 2d 47, 263 N.Y.S.2d 765 (4th Dep't 1965); People v. Farr, 80
Misc. 2d 250, 253, 362 N.Y.S.2d 915, 918 (Sup. Ct. 1974); People ex rel. Carter v.
Warden, 62 Misc. 2d 191, 308 N.Y.S.2d 552 (Sup. Ct. 1970). Still others have echoed
the language of § 1.05, also without elaboration. See, e.g., People v. Butler, 46 App. Div.
2d 422, 425, 362 N.Y.S.2d 658, 661 (4th Dep't 1975). See also the early case of People
(Vol. 25
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traces of retributive punishment have been eliminated from the Penal
Law.19 In order to determine how. effective the expungement has been,
v. Smith, 163 Misc. 469, 472, 297 N.Y.S. 489, 492 (Sup. Ct. 1937). No case could
be found, however, containing a thorough treatment of justification of punishment. But
see the interesting opinion of Justice Tilzer in People v. Corapi, 42 Misc. 2d 247, 247
N.Y.S.2d 609 (lst Dep't 1964).
There is an equally long line of cases, apparently stemming from People v. Silver,
10 App. Div. 2d 274, 199 N.Y.S.2d 254 (1st Dep't 1960), embracing the notion that
a penal sentence should "encompass the community's condemnation of the defendant's
misconduct . . . ." Id. at 276, 199 N.Y.S.2d at 256, see, e.g., People v. Gittelson, 25
App. Div. 2d 265, 269, 268 N.Y.S.2d 779, 784 (1st Dep't 1966); People v. Cotter,
25 App. Div. 2d 609, 610, 267 N.Y.S.2d 679, 680 (4th Dep't 1966); People v. Burg-
hardt, 17 App. Div. 2d 912, 233 N.Y.S.2d 60, 61 (4th Dep't 1962). None of the
cases elaborate, though. Thus, it is unclear whether some form of retribution is being
legitimized, or whether these courts are simply referring to the expressive function of
the Penal Law (which is the use of punishment as "a conventional device for the ex-
pression of attitudes of resentment and indignation, and of judgments of disapproval
and reprobation, on the part either of the punishing authority himself, or of those 'in
whose name' the punishment is inflicted." J. FEINBERG, DOING AND DESERVINo: ESSAYS
IN THE THEORY OF REsPONsIBILITY 98 (1970). As Professor H. L. A. Hart points out,
this treats "the expression of community's condemnation not as justification but as a
defining feature of legal punishment." H. L, A. HART, supra note 1, at 263).
Furthermore, the court of appeals has done little to clear the muddy waters. In large part
this is due to its interpretation of § 543 of the Code of Criminal Procedure (now con-
tained in Art. 450 and 470, CPL) and Art. 6, § 5 of the Constitution for the State of
New York, to the effect that the court has "no power to review the appropriateness of a
discretionary sentence." People v. Gittleson, 18 N.Y.2d 427, 430, 223 N.E.2d 14, 16,
276 N.Y.S.2d 596, 598 (1966), quoting People v. Speiser, 277 N.Y. 342, 344, 14 N.E.2d
380, 381 (1938). Thus, the court of appeals has had little opportunity to delve into
the area.
On the other hand, at least one New York appellate case has openly embraced retri-
bution as a justification for penal sanctions. In People v. Golden, 41 App. Div. 2d 242,
342 N.Y.S.2d 309 (1st Dep't 1973), a case decided after the Penal Law came into
effect, in disposing of the defendant's claim that his sentence was excessive, the court
stated: "The [sentencing] process must take into account several factors: the rehabili-
tative . . .; the incapacitative . . .; the deterrent effect . . .; and the vindictive, i.e.,
the measure of punishment to be inflicted upon the defendant by way of retribution for
the transgression involved." Id. at 243-44, 342 N.Y.S.2d at 310. The court said it
was relying on a retributive notion to justify the sentence in this case. Id. at 244, 342
N.Y.S.2d at 311. In reality, though, its actions belie its words. The court, in the exer-
cise of its discretion to modify sentences, reduced the defendant's sentence from four
concurrent one-year terms "to four concurrent periods of imprisonment, not to exceed
thirty days each." Id. The case was apparently not appealed, and has not been cited,
for any purpose, by any other court; nor did the court cite any authority supporting
its view of retribution as a justification of penal sanctions.
19. The wisdom and morality of retributive punishment is a matter of much dis-
pute. For a discussion of this issue, see note 123 infra. The debate is further compli-
cated by the many ideas conveyed by the word "retribution." To many, retribution,
involves relating punishment for an offense to the moral culpability of the offender.
See, e.g., HEGEL, PmILosOPHY oF RIGHT 69-71 (1942); I. KANT, THE METAPHYSICAL
ASPECTS OF JUSTICE 100-110 (1965); Griffiths, The Limits of Criminal Law Scholar-
ship, 79 YALE L.J. 1388, 1418-19 (1970). Others view retribution as providing revenge-
for harm done, a conception having its roots in the principle of lex talionis. See, e.g.,
H. PACKER, THE LImrrs OF THE CRIMINAL SANCTION 37 (1968); Michael & Wechsler,
A Rationale of the Law of Homicide II, 37 COLTUM. L. REv., 1261, 1295 n.79 (1937).
Still others view it as involving "the emphatic denunciation by the community of a.
crime." Lord Denning's testimony before the Royal Commission on Capital Punish-
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analysis must proceed to the Penal Law's substantive provisions. Anal-
ysis of those provisions reveals that the Commission systematically
employed a legislative principle of dubious merit, if retribution was to
play no part, whereby offenses were graded into greater or lesser cate-
gories 0 based solely upon the harm resulting from a proscribed act.21
As an example of this principle of aggravated harm, compare sec-
tions 120.25,.22 120.10 (3),23 and 125.25 (2).24 A close reading of these
sections will show that they differ substantively only in the harm
necessary to invoke them. If a person recklessly creates a grave risk
ment, Cmd. 8932 para. 53, quoted in H. L. A. HART, supra note 1, at 170, 263. See also
PACKER, supra at 44. This brief definitional treatment by no means adequately reflects
the complexities of retribution. See H. L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 210-37; N. WALKER,
THE AIM OF A PENAL SYSTEM (1966).
20. Section 70 of the New York Penal Law grades felonies into 5 classes (A to E),
with the most serious felonies in class A and the least serious in class E. Section 70.15
creates an analogous scheme for misdemeanors. The significance of the classification of a
felony lies in the permissible sentence. The scheme is one of decreasing severity, of both
minimum and maximum sentence, from class A to class E. Thus, for one convicted of a
class A felony, e.g., Kidnapping in the 1st degree, the court must impose a maximum
of life imprisonment and a minimum of between 15 and 25 years (this is complicated by
the fact that class A felonies are themselves broken down into three categories, as
exemplified in § 70(3) (a); this does not affect the maximum sentence but it does affect
the minimum); for one convicted of a class B felony, e.g., abortion in the second degree,
the court must impose a maximum of between three and four years, without setting a
minimum, or the court may impose a definite sentence of imprisonment of one year or
less. See generally N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00 (McKinney 1975).
21. For purposes of this article, the word "act" will refer to the proscribed con-
duct, while "result" and "harm" will refer to the physical consequences of the act. I am
using this definition solely out of convenience. For more elaborate, but for my purposes
unnecessary, treatments of these definitional problems, see J. HALL, GENERAL PRINCI-
PLES OF CRIMINAL LAW 171-246 (1960); G. WILLIAMS, CRIMINAL LAW: THE GENERAL
PART 1-29 (2d ed. 1961); Eser, Harm in the Concept of Crime, 4 DUQUESNE L. REv.
345 (1965-1966).
22. § 120.25 Reckless endangerment in the first degree.
A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the first degree when, under
circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he recklessly
engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another person.
Reckless endangerment in the first degree is a class D felony.
23. § 120.10 Assault in the first degree.
A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when:
3. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another
person, and thereby causes serious physical injury to another person; ...
Assault in the first degree is a class C felony.
24. § 125.25 Murder in the second degree.
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
2. Under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human life, he
recklessly engages in conduct which creates a grave risk of death to another
person and thereby causes the death of another person ....
Murder in the second degree is a class A-i felony.
[Vol. 25
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of death under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to
human life, but no harm to another results, he is guilty of reckless
endangerment in the first degree-a class D felony. If he commits pre-
cisely the same act under apparently similar conditions, but it results
in serious physical injury to another, he is guilty of assault in the first
degree-a class C felony. If he commits precisely the same act under
apparently similar conditions, but it results in death to another, he is
guilty of murder in the second degree-a class A-1 felony. In other
words, the maximum sentence an offender will be exposed to under
these circumstances may vary from sevefi years to life,25 apparently de-
pending upon his good fortune and nothing else. If he is fortunate
enough not to harm anyone, he can be imprisoned for no longer than
seven years; but if he is unfortunate enough to kill, he can be im-
prisoned for life. Moreover, this example is not an isolated one; the
principle of aggravated harm appears throughout the Penal Law, rang-
ing over such diverse areas as assault,2 6 burglary,27 larceny,28 felony-
25. See N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 70(2)(a),(c), (d) (McKinney 1975). And this is
quite apart from other consequences of importance. For example, not only do the maxi-
mum sentences vary dramatically, so do the minimum sentences. The minimum sentence
for a class A-1 felony is 15 to 25 years, for a class C felony 0 to 5 years, and for a
class D felony 0 to 2Y3 years. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 70.00(3). See also § 70.00(4) which
restricts the use of a short definite term of imprisonment to one convicted of a class D
or E felony; §§ 70.06(3),(4) which set varying lengths of imprisonment for second offend-
ers, depending on the class of the offense; and § 85.00 which restricts the use of intermit-
tent imprisonment to one convicted of a class D or E felony (or an offense that is not
a felony). In short, the permissible extent of state interference in an offender's life
varies dramatically depending upon the class of the felony of which he is convicted.
26. Compare:
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.05 (McKinney 1975) Assault in the second degree.
A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes such
injury to such person or to a third person ....
Assault in the second degree is a class D felony.
with:
§ 125.20 Manslaughter in the first degree.
A person is guilty of Manslaughter in the first degree when:
1. With intent to cause serious physical injury to another person, he causes
the death of such person or of a third person ....
Manslaughter in the first degree is a class B felony.
27. Compare:
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 140.25 (McKinney 1975) Burglary in the second degree.
A person is guilty of burglary in the second degree when he knowingly enters
or remains unlawfully in a building with intent to commit a crime therein,
and when:
2. The building is a dwelling and the entering or remaining occurs at night.
Burglary in the second degree is a class C felony.
with:
§ 140.30 Burglary in the first degree.
A person is guilty of burglary in the first degree when he knowingly enters or
1975]
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assault,29 and unlawfully using slugs,80 to mention but a few.81 Dif-
remains unlawfully in a dwelling at night with intent to commit a crime therein,
and when, in effecting entry or while in the dwelling or in immediate flight
therefrom, he or another participant in the crime:
2. Causes physical injury to any person who is not a participant in the
crime ....
Burglary in the first degree in a class B felony.
28. Compare:
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 155.24 (McKinney 1975) Petit larceny.
A person is guilty of petit larceny when he steals property.
Petit larceny is a class A misdemeanor.
with:
§ 155.30 Grand larceny in the third degree.
A person is guilty of grand larceny in the third degree when he steals prop-
erty and when:
1. The value of the property exceeds two hundred fifty dollars ....
Grand larceny in the third degree is a class E felony.
and with:
§ 155.35 Grand larceny in the second degree.
A person is guilty of grand larceny in the second degree when he steals prop-
erty and when the value of the property exceeds one thousand five hundred
dollars.
Grand larceny in the second degree is a class D felony. Although on its face this
sequence does not appear to implement the principle of aggravated harm, § 155.20 makes
it clear that it does:
§ 155.20 Larceny; value of stolen property.
For the purposes of this title, the value of property shall be ascertained as
follows:
1. Except as otherwise specified in this section, value means the market value
of the property at the time and place of the crime, or if such cannot be satis-
factorily ascertained, the cost of replacement of the property within a reason-
able time after the crime.
But see text accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
29. Compare:
N.Y. PENAL LAw § 120.05 (McKinney 1975) Assault in the second degree.
A person is guilty of assault in the second degree when:
6. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commis-
sion of a felony, other than a felony defined in article one hundred thirty, or of
immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if there be any, causes
physical injury to a person other than one of the participants.
Assault in the second degree is a class D felony.
(The New York Court of Appeals appears to have interpreted § 120.05(6) as a strict
liability offense. See People v. Fonseca, 36 N.Y.2d 133, 365 N.Y.S.2d 818, 325 N.E.2d
143 (1975). Thus, the "unearthly intervention" that Mr. Justice Blackmun thought
necessary before one could assault "another of whose existence one is ignorant," may
have materialized. United States v. Feola, 95 S. Ct. 1255, 1267 (1975).)
with:
§ 120.10 Assault in the first degree.
A person is guilty of assault in the first degree when:
4. In the course of and in furtherance of the commission or attempted commis-
sion of a felony or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another participant if
there be any, causes serious physical injury to a person other than one of the
participants.
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ferential sentencing3 presumably serves deterrence, rehabilitation or
Assault in the first degree is a class C felony.
and with:
§ 125.25 Murder in the second degree.
A person is guilty of murder in the second degree when:
3. Acting either alone or with one or more other persons, he commits or
attempts to commit robbery, burglary, kidnapping, arson, rape in the first
degree, sodomy in the first degree, sexual abuse in the first degree, escape
in the first degree, or escape in the second degree, and, in the course of and
in furtherance of such crime or of immediate flight therefrom, he, or another
participant, if there be any, causes the death of a person other than one of the
participants....
Murder in the second degree is a class A-1 felony.
Note also that the relationship of the felony-assault and murder sections to each
underlying felony that could support a charge of felony-assault or murder is another
illustration of the principle of aggravated harm. For brief but illuminating discussions of
this point, see MACAULAY, A PENAL CODE PREPARED BY THE INDIAN LAW COMMISSION-
ERS, Note M at 64-65 (1837); MODEL PENAL CODE § 201.2(1) (6), Comment (Tent.
Draft No. 9, 1959).
30. Compare:
N.Y. PENAL LAW § 170.55 (McKinney 1975) Unlawfully using slugs in the
second degree.
A person is guilty of unlawfully using slugs in the second degree when:
2. He makes, possesses or disposes of a slug with intent to enable a person
to insert or deposit it in a coin machine.
Unlawfully using slugs in the second degree is a class B misdemeanor.
with:
§ 170.60 Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree.
A person is guilty of unlawfully using slugs in the first degree when he makes,
possesses or disposes of slugs with intent to enable a person to insert or deposit
them in a coin machine, and the value of such slugs exceeds one hundred
dollars.
Unlawfully using slugs in the first degree is a class E felony.
But see text accompanying notes 89-94 infra.
31. For other examples of the principle of aggravated harm, compare the sections
within the following sequences: N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 145.00 -.10 (McKinney 1975);
§§ 145.00(2), -.25; §§ 160.05, -.10(2)(a), -.15(1); §§ 165.40, -.45(1), -.50; §§ 205.55,
-.60; §§ 240.05,-.06.
The principle of aggravated harm is most often discussed in the context of at-
tempts. H. L. A. HART, supra note 1, at 125-131; G. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 136-37;
Sayre, Criminal Attempts, 41 HARv. L. Rv. 821, 838-39 (1928); Strahorn, The Effect
of Impossibility on Criminal Attempts, 78 U. PA. L. Rav. 962, 966-69 (1930). If a
criminal attempt requires that the last proximate act necessary to effectuate the crime
be done, then attempts would be an example of the principle of aggravated harm (as-
suming that the penalty for the attempt is less than that for the consummated crime,
as is generally the case in New York. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.05). However, the
New York Penal Law may not require the last proximate act for there to be an at-
tempt. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 110.00. Compare People v. White, 55 Misc. 2d 298, 285
N.Y.S.2d 633 (Sup. Ct. 1967) with People v. White, 32 App. Div. 2d 463, 305
N.Y.S.2d 42 (4th Dept 1969), aff'd, 26 N.Y.2d 915, 310 N.Y.S.2d 101 (1970).
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incapacitation, but it is not clear how these goals are enhanced if an of-
32. Although this article will only treat in depth the problems engendered by the
principle of aggravated harm, other aspects of the Penal Law are arguably grounded
on a retributive basis. For example, N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.10 (McKinney 1975) makes
explicit what appears obvious from a reading of any substantive provision of the Penal
Law-that a person becomes criminally liable only upon committing an offense. Yet, of
all the theories of punishment, only retribution need be concerned with limiting punish-
ment to an offender for his offense. Rehabilitation and incapacitation need only be
concerned with a person's tendencies rather than his acts, while general deterrence need
be concerned solely with the effect on the rest of society of punishment of this indi-
vidual for what he has done, or what the rest of society can be convinced he has done.
Armstrong, The Retributionist Hits Back, in PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT 138 (H. B.
Acton ed. 1968); Mabbot, Punishment, in id. at 39; note 59 infra. (This criticism of
deterrence theory has been rejected by John Rawls on the grounds that it presupposes
a highly unlikely ability of a government to perpetrate a continuing fraud on its popu-
lace. Rawls, Two Concepts of Rules, in id. at 105. However, Rawls' point goes only to
the wisdom, not the logic, of the matter). This is a good example, once again, of the
necessity of distinguishing the justification of the practice of punishment and the justifi-
cation of individual applications of the practice of punishment. As H. L. A. Hart puts
it: "[i]t is perfectly consistent to assert both that the General Justifying Aim of the
practice of punishment is its beneficial consequences and that the pursuit of this Gen-
eral Aim should be qualified or restricted out of deferrence to principles of Distribution
which require that punishment should be only of an offender for an offense." H. L. A.
HART, supra note 1, at 9. Arguably, all that § 15.10 does is to qualify "the pursuit of
the General Aim" of the Penal Law; at any rate, only retribution logically demands that
a person commit an offense as a prerequisite to punishment.
Another issue that deserves mention is whether punishment, whatever its form, is by
definition retributive. Thus, Anthony Quinton has argued that "retributivism, properly
understood, is not a moral but a logical doctrine, and . . .does not provide a moral
justification of the infliction of punishment but an elucidation of the use of the word."
Quinton, On Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT, supra at 55. For a complete
account of this issue, see Flew, The Justification of Punishment, in id. at 83 (one of the
better known definitional attempts); Baler, Is Punishment Retributive, in id. at 130. That
the New York Penal Law contemplates "punishing" offenders seems clear. Section 1.05 (4)
states that one of the purposes of the Penal Law is "to differentiate on reasonable
grounds between serious and minor offenses, and to prescribe proportionate penalties
therefor" (emphasis added), and each of § 5.05's three subsections speaks of "punish-
ment for" offenses. See also N.Y. PENAL LAW § 10.00(1) (McKinney 1975). Moreover,
there seems to be widespread agreement that imprisonment-the most important of the
Penal Law's sanctions-for whatever reason is punishment: "The mere deprivation of
liberty, however benign the administration of the place of confinement, is undeniably
punishment." F. ALLEN, THE BORDERLAND OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE 37 (1964) quoting
GAROFALO, CRIMINOLOGY 241-42 (1914). See also People ex rel. Cerzosie v. Warden, 223
N.Y. 307, 119 N.E. 564 (1918); H. PACKER, supra note 19, at 33. For a dissent from
this equating of punishment and imprisonment, see Griffiths, The Limits of Criminal Law
Scholarship, 79 YALE L.J. 1388, 1408-10 (1970). The point is, of course, that if im-
prisonment is punishment, and punishment is retributive, then once again a significant
portion of the Penal Law is retributively based.
Whatever the ebb and flow of philosophical debate, I think it clear that to the
average man on the street the criminal law imposes punishment. As Prof. Weinreb says:
[P]unishment [does not] seem to be a necessary concomitant of the criminal
law. . . . Just the same, it is very natural to think of punishment as 'part of'
the criminal law, and most of us would regard punishment as part of the
paradigm of criminal law; it would be curious if someone gave as an example
of criminal law a rule not involving punishment for infractions.
L. WEINREB, CRIMINAL LAw 529 (1975).
One final aspect of the Penal Law that may be retributively based deserves mention,
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fender's sentence33 varies dramatically according to circumstances that
appear to be beyond his control or knowledge. 8
and that is the set of ideas contained in what H. L. A. Hart calls the "principle of re-
sponsibility." H. L. A. HART, supra note 1, at 177. The principle of responsibility refers
to the mental state required of a person before criminal liability can result. Thus, it
includes not only the intent to commit the proscribed act that is normally associated
with mens rea (N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 15.05, -.10, -. 15), but also such diverse areas as
the effect of mistake upon liability (N.Y. PENAL LAW § 15.20), infancy and insanity
(N.Y. PENAL LAW §§ 30.00-.05), justification and defense of self and property (N.Y.
PENAL LAW §§ 35.00-.30), and duress (N.Y. PENAL LAw § 40.00). (The diversity is
more apparent than real, of course, as all of these concepts are conditions excusing
liability). As Hart points out, it is easy to justify the place the principle of responsi-
bility has in the criminal law "[so] long as punishment is viewed as a return of pain
and suffering for moral evil done, justified by the intrinsic fitness of sentence to crime,
or so long as a denunciatory theory is accepted, in which the ultimate justification of
punishment is held to be its function as an expression of the community's moral indig-
nation . . . ." H. L. A. HART, supra note 1, at 176. The U.S. Court of Appeals for the
D.C. Circuit expressed Hart's point in its defense of the insanity plea: "Our collective
conscience does not allow punishment where it cannot impose blame." Durham v. United
States, 214 F.2d 862, 876 (D.C. Cir. 1954). Imposing blame, of course, is only necessary
in a retributive system. As Lady Barbara Wootton has pointed out, a system based upon
rehabilitation and incapacitation does not need the principle of responsibility because
such a system would not impose blame. See B. WOOTTON, CRIME AND THE CRIMINAL
LAW 52-57 (1963) ; Furthermore, to the extent that the existence of excusing conditions
may encourage a person to commit a criminal act by increasing his perceived chance of
avoiding liability, deterrence suffers. Although recognizing the problems excusing condi-
tions pose for deterrence, Michael and Wechsler nonetheless construct an elegant deter-
rent justification of excuses and conclude that excuses "will not seriously weaken the deter-
rent effect of the law.... ." Michael & Wechsler, A Rationale of the Law of Homicide: 1,
37 COLUrM. L. REv. 701, 752 (1937). Whether or not one should conclude that the principle
of responsibility is retributively based is disputable. Prof. Hart does not reach this con-
clusion: "There are values quite distinct from those of retributive punishment which the
system of responsibility does maintain, and which remain of great importance even if our
aims in punishing are the forward-looking aims of social protection." H.L.A. HART,
supra note 1, at 180-81. For a thorough discussion of Hart's view, see Wasserstrom,
H.L.A. Hart and the Doctrines of Mens Rea and Criminal Responsibility, 35 U. Clax.
L. REv. 92 (1967).
33. The problem is not endemic to New York. Quite a number of states have
ostensibly rejected retribution as a justification for punishment, yet still employ the
principle of aggravated harm-as does the Model Penal Code (notwithstanding the
fact that the Chief Reporter, Herbert Wechsler, recognized the problem the principle
poses. Wechsler, The Challenge of a Model Penal Code, 65 HARv. L. REv. 1097, 1106-07
(1952)). For a representative sample of these states and statutes, see Schulhofer, Harm
and Punishment: A Critique of Emphasis on the Results of Conduct in the Criminal
Law, 122 U. PA. L. REv. 1497, 1498-1503 (1974).
34. Dealing with sequences of criminal prohibitions that are essentially identical,
differing only in their respective harm requirements, isolates the issue of the significance
that is accorded the occurrence of harm. If the relevant statutes were not substantially
identical, then the problem of ascertaining the impact of the occurrence of differing
harms would be exacerbated, as other factors would have to be considered. See note 31
supra. This would involve, for example, making judgments as to the relative seriousness
of different crimes. As Prof. Armstrong has pointed out, "it may be very difficult to de-
cide which of two crimes is the more serious and thus deserving of severer punish-
ment. .. ." Armstrong, supra note 32, at 157. See also H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at
161-63. For an interesting study that suggests that neither prescribed nor imposed
penalties accurately reflect popular mores, and that there is disagreement as to appro-
priate penalties among various groups of the population, thus adding yet another wrinkle
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The purpose of this article is to examine the principle of aggra-
vated harm to determine if it is consistent with the legitimized 85 justi-
fications of punishment.36 This analysis is called for because, public
to the problem of inter-crime comparisons, see Rose & Prell, Does the Punishment Fit
the Crime?, 61 Am. J. Soc. 247 (1955-56).
On the other hand, inter-crime comparisons may yield interesting results. Com-
pare, e.g., N.Y. PENAL LAW § 120.20 (McKinney 1975) "Reckless endangerment in
the second degree: A person is guilty of reckless endangerment in the second degree
when he recklessly engages in conduct which creates a substantial risk of serious
physical injury to another person" (a class A misdemeanor) with N.Y. PENAL
LAW § 120.10(4), "Assault in the first degree: A person is guilty of assault in
the first degree when: .. . In the course of or in furtherance of the commission or at-
tempted commission of a felony or of immediate flight therefrom, he . . . causes serious
physical injury to a person other than one of the participants" (a class C felony). It
seems to me that the sanction authorized by § 120.10(4) could scarcely serve any func-
tion but retribution, given the penalty for the underlying crime or attempt, whereas the
sanction authorized by § 120.20 arguably is consistent with § 1.05(5). Moreover, for a
crime for which the sanction can serve the legitimized goals of punishment scarcely at
all, but in which harm is done, the penalty is high, as compared to a crime for which
the sanction may serve the goals but no harm is done.
35. As suggested in the text, I will discuss the implications of the differential pun-
ishment that may be imposed rather than is imposed, i.e., what the legislature, rather
than the sentencing judge, has done. The reason for this is two-fold. First, my concern
is the justification of punishment, which is primarily a legislative, rather than a judi-
cial, function. Cf. Gore v. United States, 357 U.S. 386 (1958); People v. Oliver, 1
N.Y.2d 152, 134 N.E.2d 197, 151 N.Y.S.2d 367 (1956); M. FRANKEL, CRIZMINAL
SENTENCES: LAW WITHOUT ORDER 105-18 (1972). But see Furman v. Georgia, 408
U.S. 238 (1972). Compare 408 U.S. at 342-46 (Marshall, J., concurring) with 408
U.S. at 431 (Powell, J., dissenting). Second, even if there were good data on whatjudges in New York do, which there is not, I am confident that it would simply demon-
strate the lack of consistency among sentencing judges that is prevalent throughout the
United States. For a study of sentence disparity among federal judges in New York, see
Seymour, 1972 Sentencing Study for the Southern District of New York, 45 N.Y.S.B.J.
163 (1973). Much like the two judges of old England, one of whom sentenced a chicken
thief to a few month's imprisonment while the other sentenced the thief's co-felon to be
transported, J. RomiLLY, OBSERVATIONS ON THE CRIIINAL LAW OF ENGLAND 18-19
(1810), reprinted in part in J. MICHAEL & H. WECHSLER, CRIMINAL LAW AND ITS
ADMINISTRATION 252-55 (1940), judges today seem generally unable to agree on how to
exercise their sentencing discretion. The result is wide disparity in sentencing. See THE
PRESIDENT'S COMMIISSION ON LAW ENFORCEMENT AND THE ADMINISTRATION OF JUS-
TICE, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE COURTS 14-28 (1967); SENTENCING INSTITUTE FOR
THE FIRST AND SECOND UNITED STATES JUDICIAL CIRCUITS, JUSTICE IN SENTENCING:
PAPERS AND PROCEEDINGS (1974); Appellate Review of Sentences, A Symposium at
the Judicial Conference of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit,
32 F.R.D. 249 (1962); Note, Appellate Review of Primary Sentencing Decisions: A
Connecticut Case Study, 69 YALE LJ. 1453 (1960). A more recent, and even more
shocking, example of sentence disparity than the chicken thievery case was given by
James V. Bennett. According to Mr. Bennett, two embezzlers were convicted in adjoin-
ing courtrooms during the same week and the two cases differed in no significant respect
except for the sentences imposed; one man received 30 days, the other 15 years. Ben-
nett, Count Down for Judicial Sentencing, 28 J.B. ASS'N D.C. 420, 424 (1961).
36. Another area that will not be discussed is what is done to, or with, offenders
while incarcerated. For example, N.Y. Cone. LAw § 136 (McKinney 1968) man-
dates that "each inmate shall be given a program of education which, on the basis of




statements to the contrary notvithstanding,37 the principle of aggra-
vated harm can be justified in at least two ways which have marked
retributive overtones-by a theory of retaliation, and by the notion
that punishment is necessary for "sharpening . . . the community's
sense of right and wrong."38
The principle of aggravated harm may simply be "a crude re-
taliation theory, where the degree of punishment is linked rather to
the amount of damage done than to the intention of the actor"89-- a
direct descendant of the notion of "an eye for an eye."40 Whereas lex
talionis matches the harm done to the offender with the harm done by
him, the principle of aggravated harm admits the difficulty of this4' and
employs instead a somewhat arbitrary punishment for the crime in-
volving the least harm42 and increases the punishment as the harm done
by the offender increases. Thus, the principle of aggravated harm may
be no more than a variant of a theory of retaliation that developed in
response to the difficulties inherent in a pure retaliation theory.
Furthermore, the justification of the principle of aggravated harm
may be a derivative of the justification of the pure retaliation theory. If
in fact the "criminal law was ... in origin an instrument of vengeance
by which the state satisfied ... the vindictive reactions of its citizens,"
37. See notes 11-19 supra & accompanying text.
38. H.M. HART, The Aims of the Criminal Law, 23 LAW & CONTEMP. PROS. 401
(1958). For this discussion I will assume that the severity of harm caused by an of-
fender is fortuitous. For example, I will assume that when a person recklessly creates
a grave risk of death under circumstances evincing a depraved indifference to human
life, whether he injures no one, injures someone seriously, or kills someone, is a matter
of chance and does not reflect on the actor. This assumption, of course, must be exam-
ined in turn. See note 48 infra.
39. G. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 136.
40. See I. KANT, supra note 19; H. PACxER, supra note 19, at 37.
41. The inability to match punishments to offenses with precision has long been
recognized. As Blackstone pointed out:
There are very many crimes, that will in no shape admit of these penalties,
without manifest absurdity and wickedness. Theft cannot be punished by theft,
defamation by defamation, forgery by forgery, adultery by adultery ....
4 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *13. An even better example is the difficulty
of applying the theory of "an eye for an eye" as an exact measure of punishment in the
case of a two-eyed sighted man who destroys the sight in the only good eye of another.
Id. Occasionally a fairly close equivalence between harm and the punishment was
achieved. For example, the punishment for mayhem was "the loss of the same member
as suffered by the victim." R. PERKINS, CRIMINAL LAW 188 (2d ed. 1969). See also I
H. HAWKINS, PLEAS OF THE CROWN ch. 44, § 3, at 175-76 (6th ed. 1788).
42. H. L. A. HART, supra note 1, at 162:
[E]ven if it were possible to arrange all crimes on a scale of relative seriousness,
our starting point or base of comparison must be a crime for which a penalty
is fixed otherwise than by comparison with others. We must start somewhere,
and in practice the starting point is apt to be just the traditional or usual
penalty for a given offense.
43. 3. MfICHAEL & M. ADLER, CRIME, LAW AND SOCIAL SCIENCE 340 n.7 (1933). It
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then the most logical response to a wrongful act is "the measure of
vengeance likely to be exacted by an aggrieved person under the circum-
stances of the case." 44 If an exact measure of vengeance is not possible,
the next best method of satisfying vengeful desires is a scheme that
correspondingly increases punishment as the harm done by the offender
increases, in an attempt to accommodate intensified vengeful desires-
which is precisely the effect of the principle of aggravated harm.48
The second retributive justification of the principle of aggravated
harm is the idea that retribution in punishment is necessary to main-
tain the community's revulsion to crime--"the community's sense of
right and wrong.' 46 A. Goodhart feels that "without a sense of retri-
bution we may lose our sense of wrong. Retribution in punishment is
an expression of the community's disapproval of crime, and if this retri-
bution is not given recognition then the disapproval may also disappear.
A community which is too ready to forgive the wrongdoer may end by
condoning the crime.' 47 However, the "sense of wrong" that retribu-
tive punishment may help maintain is not necessarily a single-valued
entity. Indeed, just as the desire for vengeance may be related to the
harm done, so too may the community's perception of wrong be related
to the seriousness of the consequences. Thus, while the principle of
aggravated harm may facilitate satisfaction of vengeful feelings by re-
lating harm and punishment, it may concomitantly "sharpen" the
public's "sense" of wrong.48 To the extent that it does or is designed
is occasionally suggested that the theory of retaliation is based solely on the notion that it
is right to do harm to one who does harm. Cf. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWHINS, DETERRENCE
166 (1973). So far as I know, no one has ever taken the position that punishment is
justified for no other reason than that harm was done. Even the early law of England
that seemed to ground the criminal law on a strict liability basis did not punish solely
because harm was done. 2 F. POLLOCK & F. MAITLAND, HISTORY OF ENGLISH LAW
448-62, 470 (1968).
44. H. MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 365 (1861).
45. Whether the public in fact desires that vengeance be exacted on criminals is
disputed by some. Weihofen, Retribution is Obsolete, in RESPONSIBILITY 116, 120
(Nomos, No. 3, 1960). But see note 126 infra.
46. H. M. Hart, supra note 38.
47. A. GOODHART, ENGLISH LAW AND THE MORAL LAW 92-93 (1953). See also
F. ALEXANDER & H. STAUB, THE CRIMINAL, THE JUDGE, AND THE PUBLIC 5-9, 213-15
(1931). This belief that punishment is necessary to maintain the community's sense of
wrongdoing is what underlies James Fitzjames Stephen's famous comment that "the
sentence of the law is to the moral sentiment of the public in relation to any offense what
a seal is to hot wax." 2 J. STEPHEN, HISTORY OF THE CRIMINAL LAW IN ENGLAND 81
(1883); see H. PACKER, supra note 19, at 37. The extent to which the "sentence of the
law" ought to be "to the moral sentiment of the public" as a "seal is to hot wax," has
been the source of much debate. Compare J. MILL, ON LIBERTY (1859) with J.
STEPHEN, LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (1873); and P. DEVLIN, THE ENFORCE-
MENT OF MORALS (1965) with H.L.A. HART, LAW, LIBERTY AND MORALITY (1963).
48. This discussion of retribution and the principle of aggravated harm was predi-
cated upon the assumption that the occurrence of any particular severity of harm is
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to do either, a justification with strong retributive attributes may be
constructed.49
II
Simply demonstrating that the principle of aggravated harm may
be retributively justified does not complete the inquiry-analysis must
proceed further. Since our concern is whether the Penal Law sub-
scribes to its own mandate, deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilita-
tion must be examined as possible justifications." This examination
will be facilitated by breaking the discussion down into two parts, each
operating on one of the two assumptions that the principle itself must
operate on: (a) the severity of resultant harm of any particular pro-
hibited act is fortuitous and does not reflect on the actor; or (b) the
severity of harm is not fortuitous and does reflect on the actor.51
A reading of any sequence of sections which employs the principle of
aggravated harm suggests that the first of these two assumptions is
operant,5 2 for there are absolutely no differences in the elements of each
particular crime of a series other than the requisite harm. Nonetheless,
the significance of the occurrence of harm must itself be examined in
order to ascertain if harm is simply the unfortunate result of other
fortuitous. See note 38 supra. That assumption may be contrary to fact, however, as I
will later discuss. See § II B infra. For present purposes it is sufficient to note that if
the occurrence of more severe harm does indicate a greater moral culpability on the
part of the offender, then once again the principle of aggravated harm can be retribu-
tively justified. In fact, if harm does indicate culpability, then to the extent that retri-
bution entails relating punishment to the moral culpability of the offender, which is the
position of most retributionists, the principle of aggravated harm becomes a necessary
component of punishment. Bradley, The Vulgar Notion of Responsibility in Connexion
with the Theories of Free-Will and Necessity, in ETHICAL STUDIES 1 (1870). Kant car-
ried the concept of retributive punishment one step further; not only did moral culpa-
bility justify punishment, punishment was a categorical imperative in such cases, which
makes punishment "obligatory, even on the eve of a dissolution of a society against
whose laws the person to be punished has offended." H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at
232. See also I. KANT, PHMOSOPHY oF LAw 198 (Hastie transl. 1887).
49. This discussion of "sharpening the community's sense of right and wrong" is
similar to but different from the discussion of the moralizing or educative function of
the criminal law that is to follow. See notes 74-80 & 94-95 infra & accompanying
text. The difference lies in the importance of punishment as an expression of vindictive
feelings. Furthermore, it is not necessary that the principle of aggravated harm help
to maintain a community's "sense of right and wrong" for there to be a retributive
justification. It suffices if the principle facilitates expressing the community's condemna-
tion, regardless what the secondary consequences may be.
50. Other explanations of the Penal Law's reliance on harm are noted in § III
infra.
51. This is, of course, the logical structure employed in the discussion of the retri-
butive justification of the principle. See notes 38 & 48 supra. The discussion of (b) will
amount, in essence, to a consideration of the validity of (a).
52. See notes 22-24, 26-31 supra.
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factors, or whether the occurrence of harm yields insights into those
other factors which suggest that the severity of harm is a relevant
criterion in determining the appropriate sanction by a penal system
that has purportedly abandoned retributive notions of punishment.68
A
If we assume that the severity of the resultant harm of a proscribed
act is fortuitous, relating the term of imprisonment to the severity of
the resultant harm clearly cannot be justified on the basis of rehabili-
tation or incapacitation.
Rehabilitation and incapacitation are concerned primarily with
the offender's personal characteristics. "Rehabilitation" involves isolat-
ing a person who is not able to function appropriately in society,
diagnosing the cause of the inability to function, and eliminating it, so
that the offender may be returned to society.54 "Incapacitation" entails
the restraint of a person who has sufficiently strong anti-social tenden-
cies that there is a high risk that if he is released he will commit further
criminal acts.55 In both, the concern is the offender rather than his
acts5 -- the goal of rehabilitation being to "cure the disease,"'5 7 while
that of incapacitation being to quarantine it.
If the concern is the characteristics of the offender, as it is with
rehabilitation and incapacitation, and if the severity of the resultant
harm is fortuitous, as we have assumed, then it is obvious that the se-
verity of harm is not relevant to the determination of a sanction that is
to serve either function. If the resultant harm is entirely fortuitous, then
the severity of harm will not reflect the personal characteristics of the
offender. Consequently, the principle of aggravated harm cannot be
justified on the basis of rehabilitation or incapacitation, given our
present assumption.5 s
53. See N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) (McKinney 1967). The examination will be
one of marginal gain-whether the increased penalty when harm occurs yields increased
deterrence, enhances rehabilitation or better protects society.
54. N. MoRRms, THE FUTURE OF IMPRISONMENT 12-20 (1974); PACKER, supra
note 19, at 53-58.
55. Cf. H. PACKER, supra note 19, at 48-53.
56. In fact, neither rehabilitation nor incapacitation demands a prior criminal act,
as they are concerned with propensity. See H. PACKER, supra note 19, at 48-58 & note 32
supra.
57. The metaphor of disease has recently come under attack. N. Moms, supra
note 54, at 16-20; K. Boyle, The Disease Concept of Crime, 21 No. IRE. L.Q. 274
(1970).
58. Glanville Williams reaches a similar conclusion in his discussion of the rele-
vance of harm in the context of attempts:
In a moral view, it may be thought that a person who attempts a crime is as bad
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To complete this analysis, deterrence5" must be examined. Before
proceeding, however, a caveat is in order. Notwithstanding the ancient
lineage of deterrence theory,10 there is scant empirical validation of
its tenets.01 Indeed, one commentator has concluded that empirical
validation of deterrence theory is so slight that, "[a]nalysis ... must...
proceed on a level ... akin to minor tinkering with third-rate equip-
ment."0 2 Nonetheless, there is a general consensus that penal laws do
have a deterring effect on criminality,63 as exemplified in the New
York Penal Law. 4 This alone justifies rigorous analysis, but we must
proceed more on a logical than empirical plane, even though the de-
terrent efficacy of any particular scheme is an empirical, not a logical,
matter. That we cannot definitively resolve complex empirical ques-
tions should not be all that troublesome, however. We can still examine
what limited evidence there is to support a deterrence justification of
as he who by better fortune manages to consummate it. Punishment as moral
expiation (if that theory is maintained) should therefore fall on both with the
same severity. Again, the objects of incapacitation and reform would permit of
no distinction being made, for the danger is the same where the criminal's failure
to complete is due only to chance.
G. WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 136.
59. My concern here is general, rather than specific, deterrence. Specific deter-
rence, with its concern for the inhibiting effect of punishment on the offender, is sub-
sumed under the issue of the chance of a particular offender recidivating. See notes
97-98 infra & accompanying text.
60. A lineage that extends at least as far back as Plato:
No one punishes the evil-doer under the notion, or for the reason, that he has
done wrong-only the unreasonable fury of a beast acts in that manner. But
he who desires to inflict rational punishment does not retaliate for a past wrong
which cannot be undone; he has regard for the future and is desirous that
the man who is punished, and he who sees him punished, may be deterred from
doing wrong again. He punishes for the sake of prevention.
PLATO, PROTAGORAs 324 (B. Jowett tranls. 1956). See also PLATO, THE REPUBLIC 380,
615 (Bloom tranls. 1968). Aristotle, Cicero and St. Thomas Aquinas apparently concurred
with Plato. See MICHAEL & ADLER, supra note 43, at 342-52.
61. See J. ANDENAES, PUNISHMENT AND DETERRENCE 3-33 (1974). This is not to
say, of course, that empirical evidence of any proposition of deterrence theory is en-
tirely lacking. See, e.g., id. at ch. III; Cramton, Driver Behavior and Legal Sanctions:
A Study of Deterrence, 67 MICH, L. REv. 421 (1969); Schwartz & Orleans, On Legal
Sanctions, 34 U. CHI. L. REv. 274 (1967). For a collection of studies suggesting that
punishment does deter crime, see Tullock, Does Punishment Deter Crime, 36 THE PUB.
INTEREST 103 (1974).
62. Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 1518. See also ANDENABS, supra note 61, at
9-10: "[I]t can hardly be denied that any conclusions as to the real nature of general
prevention [deterrence] involves a great deal of guesswork."
63. See notes 60-61 supra; N. MoRRIs, supra note 54, at 58; H. PACKER, supra
note 19, at 39-45; F. ZIMRING, PERSPECTIVES ON DETERRENCE (1971); MICHAEL &
WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 1264-68; Morris & Zimring, Deterrence and Corrections,
381 ANNALS 137 (1964). The consensus is by no means unanimous, however. See H.
BARNES & N. TEETERS, NEW HoRIzONS IN CRIMINOLOGY 338 (2d ed. 1951) ("the
claim for deterrence is belied by both history and logic") ; ELLINGTON, PROTECTING OUR
CHILDREN FROM CRIMINAL CAREERS 43 (1948).
64. N.Y. PENAL LAW § 1.05(5) (McKinney 1967).
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the principle of aggravated harm. If we find that, given present knowl-
edge, deterrence theory cannot sustain the principle, this alone will not
unequivocally settle the issue, for knowledge may advance. But it may
settle whether the New York Legislature could reasonably have con-
cluded that the principle of aggravated harm serves deterrence. Bear-
ing in mind, then, the limited nature of the inquiry,°  we may examine
the relationship between deterrence and the principle of aggravated
harm, still proceeding on the assumption that the severity of the re-
sultant harm is fortuitous.
The examination begins with what is often called the classical
theory of deterrence,6 6 a theory that conceives of man as "a 'lightning
calculator of pleasures and pains,' . . . directly responsive to systemic
intimidation by threat of punishment designed to outweigh any
pleasure to be derived from crime."67 If men are calculating animals
that weigh the costs and benefits of their actions, as the classical theory
postulates, then the "simplest way to make people more law abiding
. . . is to increase punishment." 68 By increasing the punishment, the
perceived disutility 9 of pursuing a particular course of conduct is in-
creased, thus necessitating a greater perceived expected return before
prudence dictates that the conduct be pursued. If perceptions of the
expected return of any course of conduct vary in the populace, then
as the punishment for engaging in that conduct is increased, fewer
people will think the risk worth taking.70 According to the classical
65. One of the best examples of the occasional disparity between theory and prac-
tice is the oft discussed but apparently apocryphal study that concluded that the bumble-
bee could not fly. For a gap just as large as that between the bees and the mathema-
ticians, see the discussion of d'Alembert's Paradox in T. VON KARMAN, AERODYNAMICS
25-27 (1954).
66. P. TAPPAN, CRME, JUSTICE AND CORECTION 247 (1960). The classical
theory's best known proponent is probably Bentham. See J. BENTHAM, AN INTRODUC-
TION TO THE PRINCIPLES OF MORALS AND LEGISLATION (1876). See also C. BECCARIA,
ON GRIMES AND PUNISHMENT (1770).
67. Hawkins, Punishment and Deterrence: The Educative, Moralizing and Habitua-
tive Effects, 1969 Wis. L. REv. 550.
68. J. ANDENAES, supra note 61, at 22. The enactment of the drug law, N.Y. PENAL
LAW §§ 220.00-.45 (McKinney 1967), seems to be an example of the Legislature trying
to implement this theory. See Note, Drug Abuse, Law Abuse and the Eighth Amend-
ment: New York's 1973 Drug Legislation and the Prohibition Against Cruel and Un-
usual Punishment, 60 CORNELL L. Rav. 638, 658-69 (1975).
69. Perceived disutility is the individual's perception of the risk he is taking, multi-
plied by the disutilit9 of the consequences if he is caught. Kaplan, Decision Theory
and the Factfinding Process, 20 STAN. L. REv. 1065, 1068-69 (1968).
70. The problem is complicated by the fact that the perceived disutility is a func-
tion of both the severity of punishment and the certainty of its imposition. Antunes
& Hunt, The Impact of Certainty and Severity of Punishment on Levels of Crime in
American States: An Extended Analysis, 64 J. CRim. L.C. & P.S. 486 (1973); Ehrlich,
Participation in Illegitimate Activities: A Theoretical and Empirical Investigation, 81
J. POL. EcoN. 521 (1973); Kaplan, supra note 69. For purposes of this article, I am
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theory, those people who chose not to offend will have been deterred
from criminality.
Superficially, the principle of aggravated harm appears to imple-
ment the classical theory of deterrence. As harm increases so does the
severity of punishment, which makes the conduct less attractive. If,
however, the severity of resultant harm is a matter of chance, this re-
lationship between the principle and the classical theory cannot be
maintained. What is to be deterred is the conduct that causes the harm,
rather than the harm itself. Thus, the penalities should be imposed by
reference to the act rather than the act's fortuitous results.
For example, consider once again the situation where a person
recklessly creates a grave risk of death under circumstances evincing a
depraved indifference to human life.7 1 If it is a simple matter of chance
whether in these circumstances no harm or death to another results,
the penal sanction should increase the costs of recklessly creating a
grave risk of death, rather than the costs related to a fortuitous event.72
By directing attention to the harm rather than to the underlying con-
assuming that the perceived certainty of imposition does not vary with changes in se-
verity. This assumption is most likely contrary to fact in many cases (such as when a
hue and cry is raised over a particular form of criminality resulting in increased penal-
ties and prosecution). If this assumption is not contrary to fact yet another problem is
posed for a deterrence justification of the principle of aggravated harm. The Antunes'
study found no evidence to suggest that an increase in severity of punishment without
an increase in certainty of imposition affects crime rates. Antunes, supra at 492-93.
Another complicating factor is that apparently people differ in their synthesis of the
two factors that form expected disutility. Becker, Crime and Punishment, An Economic
Approach, 76 J. POL. ECON. 169 (1968). For a discussion of these problems, see Schul-
hofer, supra note 33, at 1544-54; F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 43, at 162-72,
195-202.
71. See notes 22-25 supra.
72. A point apparently overlooked by commentators is that in one limited way the
principle of aggravated harm is consistent with classical deterrence theory even if the
occurrence of harm is fortuitous. Consider, for example, Prof. Schulhofer's analysis of
the Harm Hater's hypothesis that presumes "that the amount of deterrence achieved is
solely a function of the penalty applicable to the underlying conduct in the absence of
harm." Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 1534. His argument is that under the Harm Hater's
hypothesis a scheme that imposed a sentence of one year imprisonment regardless of
whether harm occurred and a scheme that imposed one year if no harm occurred and
two years if it did would have the same deterrent efficacy, presumably because the
operant threat is the one directed to the conduct-which is one year in all cases. But,
if anyone receives the higher penalty, even though due to the fortuitous occurrence
of harm, then the expected disutility of the conduct is not a function of the risk of one
year in prison; rather, it is a function of a higher penalty than that. Just how high, of
course, depends on how often the fortuitous event occurs. In other words, by imposing
an increased penalty, even on an arbitrary basis, the perceived disutility of engaging in
the underlying conduct is increased since the chance of more than one year in prison
must be accounted for. According to classical deterrence theory this should increase
the deterrent efficacy of the penal law, although it does so on the basis of inequality of
treatment. See note 133 infra.
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duct that is to be deterred, the principle of aggravated harm acts in
opposition to classical deterrence theory.78
Deterrence theory, though, has evolved from the days of Beccaria
and Bentham. The theory of man as "a lightning calculator of pains
and pleasures" who can be directly influenced by the threat of un-
pleasant consequences has been supplemented by speculation as to the
moral or socio-pedagogical influence of punishment.7 4 This specula-
tion75 concerns the extent to which the penal law, through its moral
influence,76 inhibits criminality through the inculcation of either
norms or the habit of law abiding. If the criminal law does exert in-
fluences of this sort on the populace, thereby inhibiting criminality,
deterrence will have been served, albeit in a different way than the
73. The statutory scheme we are discussing may serve the function, in a limited
number of cases, of encouraging the perpetrator of the criminal act to go to the aid of
another. Thus, for example, distinguishing between felony assault and felony murder
may facilitate aid being brought to the injured party. See note 29 supra. This argument
is analogous to the argument that a lower penalty for attempts, as compared to the
consummated crime, serves as an incentive to abandon the scheme. MICHAEL &
WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 1295 n.81. Even if this argument has validity, I would
think the same result could be accomplished in a more direct manner.
74. ANDENAES, supra note 61, at 35. See also Morris, Impediments to Penal Re-
form, 33 U. CHI. L. Rav. 627, 631 (1966). Just as it is debated whether the public
demands retribution from offenders, so too is it debated whether the criminal law has
a moralizing or educative effect. Compare J. ANDENAES, supra note 61, at ch. IV (The
Moral or Educative Influence of the Criminal Law) with Walker & Argyle, Does the
Law Affect Moral Judgments, 4 BRIT. J. CRIM. 570 (1969). For an excellent discussion
of the issue, see Hawkins, supra note 67.
It is not quite fair to suggest that the early formulators of deterrence theory did
not appreciate the moralizing possibilities of criminal sanctions. As Andenaes points
out, Beccaria "expresses a strong belief in the potentialities of criminal law to influence
moral attitudes in society." J. ANDENAES, supra note 61, at 113.
If the same punishment be decreed for killing a pheasant as for killing a man,
or for forgery, all difference between these crimes will shortly vanish. It is thus
that moral sentiments are destroyed in the heart of man.
BEcCARIA, supra note 66, at 139. See also J. BENTHAM, supra note 66, at 61.
75. I do not mean to denigrate this position, and my description of it as specu-
lative is meant only to convey that the extent to which these effects occur is an em-
pirical question for which there is, as of yet, no solid answer. See R.S. PETERS, ETHICS
AND EDUCATION 274 (1966).
76. The best statement of this position is J. ANDENAES, supra note 61, at ch. IV.
(The Moral or Educative Influence of Criminal Law). Prof. Andenaes' cautious presen-
tation considers various ways, grouped into the categories of direct and indirect influ-
ences, by which the content of the criminal law may exert a moralizing or pedagogical
influence. The direct influences, which he feels are of lesser importance than the in-
direct, are: (1) respect for formal law; (2) the criminal law as a moral eye-opener; and
(3) punishment as authoritative statements about wrongdoing. The indirect influences
include: (1) punishment as eliminating bad examples; and (2) the criminal law as a
formulator of the framework for moral education. For a critical review of much of
this, see Hawkins, supra note 67.
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simple reliance on ,the threat of painful consequences 77 that is the
crucial proposition of classical deterrence theory.78
Regardless of the validity of this more sophisticated form of de-
terrence theory, it suffers from the same flaw of misdirection as does
classical deterrence theory, if utilized to justify the principle of aggra-
vated harm. If the harm resulting from a proscribed act is fortuitous,
then whatever pedagogical or moralizing influence the criminal law
has should be directed toward the conduct, not the result. This is not
to say that the principle of aggravated harm does not serve the moraliz-
ing function at least indirectly, because it may. Occasionally inflicting
a more severe penalty, even though based upon chance occurrences,
does increase the expected disutility of the conduct and, consequently,
may affect society's view of the act.79 Nor is it to say that the distribu-
tion of the resultant harm is irrelevant in determining the gravity of
the crime and the need for deterrence. Surely it is not.80 But, this is to
say that the limited extent to which the moralizing function is served by
the principle of aggravated harm is a mere happenstance rather than
the necessary outcome of a system rationally constructed to achieve that
end.
In short, if the severity of resultant harm is fortuitous, pursuit of
the affirmative goals of rehabilitation, incapacitation and deterrence is
little enhanced by the principle of aggravated harm. At best, the con-
tribution of the principle is a speculative by-product of a misdirected
effort. The most persuasive justification of the principle remains that
it implements a retributive notion of punishment; any rehabilitative,
incapacitative, or deterrent gains are simply welcome side-effects.
Before we can conclude, however, that there is no substantial justifica-
tion of the principle of aggravated harm other than retribution in one
form or another, we must examine the assumption upon which this
77. Deterrence theory has evolved in another way. It is becoming increasingly clear
that the classical model needs supplementation not only with respect to the secondary
effects of threats, but also with respect to the mechanics of threats. See F. ZMRiNrG &
G. HAWKINS, supra note 43, at ch. IV (The Deterrent Effect), 298 n.67. See also note
70 supra.
78. For a criticism of including the inhibiting effect on criminality that a penal
law may effect by way of its educative or moralizing tendencies within the definition of
deterrence, see Hawkins, supra note 67, at 551-52. This appears to me to be a rather
uneventful semantic quibble, although Prof. Hawkins apparently feels otherwise. Id. at
552.
79. See note 72 supra.
80. For example, if conduct X results 70% of the time in no harm, 20% in phys-
ical harm to another and 10% in death, then it is obviously less serious conduct than Y
if Y results in physical harm 40% of the time and death 60% (assuming the incidence
of X and Y to be equal).
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discussion has been based. We proceed, then, to an examination of the
significance of the harm resulting from a proscribed act.
B
Briefly, the issue is whether the severity of resultant harm dif-
ferentiates among similar acts8l in such a way as to make it a relevant
criterion in the imposition of a sanction for deterrent, rehabilitative,
or incapacitative purposes.
Ways in which harm could act as a rational discriminator come
easily to mind. For instance, a more severe harm may indicate that the
actor is a more dangerous individual, likely to engage in further crim-
inality, or that he is "sicker" and more in need of rehabilitation than
one who commits ostensibly the same act but with more felicitous re-
sults. Either could be true if the severity of harm is an indication of
the strength of anti-social propensities or characteristics. Whether the
severity of harm yields insights into the desires and motivation of the
actor, insights that are relevant in determining the appropriate sanc-
tion, is another issue that must be considered.
Regardless of the validity of any of the suggestions above, none of
them demonstrate that the severity of harm is more than tangentially
relevant to the determination of a sanction designed to serve deterrence.
Even if the occurrence of a serious harm is positively correlated with
highly dangerous actors whom we wish to deter more than others, 2
deterrence of this group is not likely to be enhanced by punishing its
members more severely than others.8 3 For a threat to deter a particular
group, the threat must be communicated to its members, 4 and they
must perceive the threat as applicable to them. As Zimring and Haw-
kins have said: "Members of an audience will not fear the imposition
of threatened consequences unless they are persuaded that the threat
is meant to apply to them."' 5 In other words, even if harm does dis-
tinguish the less from the more dangerous, punishing the latter more
harshly than the former will have the intended deterrent effect only
so far as there are those who consider it likely that if they engage in the
81. See text of statute accompanying notes 22-31 supra.
82. This assumption is likely contray to fact. See notes 99-111 infra & accompany-
ing text.
83. It may, of course, have some specific deterrence effect, but our concern is
general deterrence. See note 59 supra.
84. J. ANDENAES, supra note 61, at 137. See also F. ZIMRINO & G. HAWINs,
supra note 43, at 142-49.
85. F. ZIMRING & G. HAWKINS, supra note 43, at 158.
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prohibited conduct the necessary harm is likely to occur-a small
group, no doubt.86
Nor does any relationship between severity of harm and the actor's
desires87 support a deterrence justification of the principle of aggravated
harm. Here there are two possible cases: either the severity of harm in-
dicates the extent to which the actor desired to commit the proscribed
act, or it indicates that the actor desired to effect the consequences that
in fact occurred. For purposes of deterrence, the first of these-the
strength of the actor's desires to commit the proscribed act-is im-
material. What is to be deterred is not the, vehement unlawful use of
slugs, for example,s8 but any unlawful use of slugs, even if half-hearted.
Vagaries of desire are dearly of no interest to deterrence theory, for it
is the simple doing of the act that is of importance. The offender and
his offense are being used as examples for the edification of others.
On the other hand, the second possibility-that the occurrence of
a certain severity of harm indicates that the actor intended to effect
that harm-may lend some limited support to a deterrence justification
of the principle of aggravated harm. The extent of this support can
86. But see note 72 supra; there may be increased deterrence for other reasons.
87. The discussion of motivation is concerned only with conscious motivation. Some
commentators have raised the issue of unconscious motivation in various discussions of
the criminal law. See, e.g., Ryu, Causation in the Criminal Law, 106 U. PA. L. Rav. 773,
798 (1958). Their discussions, to this author, are to little avail. In large part this is
due to the poor state of the art-we know too little of unconscious motivation and even
less of how to unearth and deal with it. Much like the issue of free will, "the prac-
tical business of government and administration of law is obliged to proceed on more
or less rough and ready judgments, based on the assumption that mature and rational
persons are in control of their own conduct." Gregg Cartage & Storage Co. v. United
States, 316 U.S. 74, 80 (1942).
Prof. Packer argues for proceeding on the assumption that people are in control of
their own lives because of the necessity of drawing a line beyond which coercive state
intervention in a citizen's life is forbidden:
Neither philosophic concepts nor psychological realities are actually at issue in
the criminal law. The idea of free will in relation to conduct is not, in the
legal system, a statement of fact, but rather a value preference having very
little to do with the metaphysics of determinism and free will. The fallacy
that legal values describe physical reality is a very common one. . . . But we
need to dispose of it here, because it is such a major impediment to rational
thought about the criminal law. Very simply, the law treats man's conduct as
autonomous and willed, not because it is, but because it is desirable to proceed
as if it were. It is desirable because the capacity of the individual human
being to live his life in reasonable freedom from socially imposed external con-
straints (the only kind with which the law is concerned) would be fatally im-
paired unless the law provided a locus poenitentiae, a point of no return beyond
which external constraints may be imposed but before which the individual is
free-not free of whatever compulsion determinants tell us he labors under
but free of the very specific social compulsions of the law.
H. PACKER, supra note 19, at 74-75.
88. See text of statute accompanying note 30 supra.
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be gauged by distinguishing between those sequences of prohibitions
for which it is highly unlikely that the occurrence of harm reflects on
the intent or knowledge of the actor,8 9 and those for which the prin-
ciple acts as a surrogate knowledge requirement. An example of the
latter is the larceny sequence,90 where the distinction between grand
and petit larceny is based not on the knowledge of the actor but on the
market value of the goods stolen.9' Although theoretically this is an
example of the principle of aggravated harm, since the sanction an
offender is exposed to may vary depending upon factors beyond his
control, 92 this sequence is designed to serve a different function. Im-
plicit in the sequence is the judgment that people have a rough idea
of the value of things. The larceny sequence utilizes this judgment to
simplify the prosecutor's task by replacing a knowledge requirement,
which is difficult to prove, with an irrebuttable presumption that is
easy to use.93 Insofar as the judgment this sequence may rest upon is
true-that people have a rough idea of the value of what they steal-
marginal deterrence may be served by allocating more severe punish-
ment to the individual who commits grand larceny. However, insofar
as this judgment is true, the larceny sequence is not an example of the
principle of aggravated harm at all, since the punishment to which an
offender is exposed no longer depends upon factors beyond his control.
To the extent it is not true, a deterrence justification for the principle
of aggravated harm cannot be formulated, as we have seen.9 4
Similar problems exist for the relationship of the principle of
aggravated harm to the moralizing or educative influence of the crim-
inal law. To the extent that harm done is a reflection of moral culp-
89. The felony-assault sequence, note 29 supra, is a good example. Although I can
present no empirical validation, I very much doubt that there are many who commit
nonviolent felonies with the intent to do physical injury. Furthermore, if the occur-
rence of harm does not reflect an intent, then the principle of aggravated harm cannot
be justified on the basis of deterrence. See notes 68-80 supra & accompanying text.
90. See text of statute accompanying note 28 supra.
91. Id.
92. For example, a person who shoplifts what he believes to be a $15 Spiro Agnew
watch has committed grand larceny if it turns out that the watch is a $1,000 original.
93. Cf. Morissette v. United States, 342 U.S. 246, 263 (1951).
Prof. Schulhofer feels that the principle of aggravated harm could profitably be em-
ployed to raise a rebuttable presumption of dangerousness, as MODEL PENAL CODE
§ 201.2(1) (b), Comment (Tent. Draft No. 9, 1959) does. Schulhofer, supra note 33, at
1595-96. This would place the burden on the defendant who has committed a proscribed
act with harmful results to show that he is not more dangerous than another who com-
mitted a similar act with less severe consequences (thus demonstrating that he is not
deserving of a harsher sentence). Although an interesting idea, it obscures rather than
clarifies the real issue-which is whether the relationship between harm and dangerous-
ness justifies differential treatment.
94. See note 89 supra.
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ability, relating harm to punishment may serve deterrence by impress-
ing on the populace the direct relationship between moral culpability
and the disutility of a proscribed act. This may serve to "educate" the
populace as to the heinousness of more severe forms of criminality,
thereby enhancing deterrence. But, in only a few sequences of sections
is it likely that harm done actually reflects culpability,95 and in those
the principle of aggravated harm has been supplanted for reasons of
expediency.96 In short, the needs of deterrence are not served by the
principle of aggravated harm.
There remains to be considered the relationship between the prin-
ciple of aggravated harm and rehabilitation and incapacitation. Here it
will not do to assume that the severity of harm is directly related to an
offender's propensity to future criminality or his need of rehabilitation.
If severity of harm is directly related to either, then the principle of
aggravated harm serves both functions by relating the length of im-
prisonment to the severity of harm, thus lengthening the time during
which the offender is subject to state control. This not only extends the
period during which the offender is unable to recidivate but also ex-
pands the time available to treat him.97 Hence, the issue now to be con-
sidered is whether the severity of harm resulting from a proscribed
act indicates a person's need of treatment or restraint. More speci-
95. The only other sequence than larceny in which this is likely is the unlawful use
of slugs. See note 30 stepra.
96. See notes 89-94 supra & accompanying text.
97. In fact, I am being too generous to the rehabilitative model, as the evidence
suggests that there is a slight negative relationship between time served and success on
release. Hearings on Corrections, Federal and State Parole System Before Subcom. No. 3
of the House Comm. on the judiciary, 92d Cong., 2d Sess., ser. 15, pt. 7-A, at 224
(testimony of D. Gottfredson, Criminological Researcher) (1972). D. Jaman studied
parole performances of persons committed for robbery or burglary in California, and
concluded that the longer a person is held the greater is the chance that he will recidi-
vate, even if the findings are adjusted to account for the fact that poorer parole risks
are retained longer. D. Jaman, Parole Outcome and Time Served by First Releases
Committed for Robbery and Burglary, 1965 Releases (California Department of Correc-
tions, Measurement Unit, 1968). Robison and Smith concluded, based on Jaman's data,
that "regardless of which 'treatments' are administered while . . . [an offender) is in
prison, the longer he is kept there the more he will deteriorate and the more likely is
it that he will recidivate." Robison & Smith, The Effectiveness of Correctional Pro-
grams, 17 CIME & DELiN. 67, 72 (1971). See also D. GLAsER, TnE EFFECTIVENESS
OF A PRISON AND PAROLE SYSTEM 301-04 (1964); G. KASSELBAUM, D. WARD, & D.
WILNER, PRISON TREATMENT AND PAROLE SURVIVAL: AN EMPIRICAL ASSESSMENT 177
(1971). This is not to say that rehabilitative techniques could not be developed or
implemented so that the length of incarceration would be inversely proportional to the
possibility of recidivism, but it is to say that apparently that is not now the case. In
fact, extending imprisonment for rehabilitative purposes is probably counter-productive,




fically, the issue is whether the severity of harm is related to the chance
of recidivism of the offender.98
The investigation of the relationship between severity of harm
and recidivism is beset by a difficult problem that should be noted at
the outset. The investigation must be empirical to yield satisfactory
results, since we are now testing the assumptions we have proceeded
upon. Yet, there have been no empirical studies of the narrow issue
of the relationship of the severity of harm resulting from a proscribed
act and recidivism. There have been serious investigations of two re-
lated areas, however, that shed some light on the problem. These two
areas are the attempts to develop predictive technologies able to gauge
an offender's chance of success on parole, and the likelihood that an
offender will engage in violent criminality upon release. Although the
work done in these areas will not unequivocally dispose of the con-
tention that severity of harm is a predictor of recidivism, it will dem-
onstrate the dubiousness of it.
First, parole prediction. In response to criticisms directed at the
procedural inadequacies of the parole process"9 and the exercise of dis-
cretion within its decision-making process,1°0 the U.S. Board of Parole
recently promulgated the Guidelines for Decision-making. 101 The os-
tensible purpose of the Guidelines is to provide a rational and objective
method of exercising discretion in parole release decision-making. 102
One component of the Guidelines is the Salient Factor Score, which is
designed to predict the likelihood that an offender will succeed on
98. That the issue can be appropriately narrowed to this is clear if two points
are noted. First, the desires or motivation of the offender as demonstrated by the
severity of harm (or by anything else) are not directly relevant to rehabilitation or in-
capacitation, although whatever insights motivation may yield into the offender's propen-
sities are. However, we need not go through the logical chain of harm implying moti-
vation which in turn implies propensities. The concern is with any relationship for
whatever reasons between harm and propensities, and that issue will be studied directly.
Second, although the word "rehabilitation" conceivably could convey more than the at-
tempt to return an offender to society as a functioning member, the word usually re-
fers to the process of resocialization. Compare N. MoRm, supra note 54, at 26 with N.Y.
CORREC. LAW § 136 (McKinney 1935).
99. See Kastenmeir & Eglit, Parole Release Decision Making: Rehabilitation, Ex-
pertise, and the Demise of Mythology, 22 Am. U.L. REv. 477 (1973); Comment, Curb-
ing Abuse in the Decision to Grant or Deny Parole, 8 HARv. Civ. RIoTS-Civ. Lia. L.
Rv. 419 (1973).
100. See Note, judicial Application of Procedural Due Process in Parole Release
and Revocation, 11 Am. Cams. L. REv. 1017 (1973); Comment, supra note 99.
101. For a thorough account of the Guidelines history, see Project, Parole Release
Decision Making and the Sentencing Process, 84 YALE L.J. 810, 822 nn.58-60 (1975)
(hereinafter cited as Project).
102. See Gottfredson, Hoffman, Sigler & Wilkins, Making Paroling Policy Explicit,
21 CasmE & DELIN. 34 (1975).
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parole. The Salient Factor Score is used in conjunction with the Of-
fense Severity Index' ° 3-a fairly subjective ranking of the seriousness
of particular crimeslO4--to determine the approximate first release date
of an offender.
Although the operation of the Guidelines is not of interest for our
purposes, the Salient Factor Score is, as it is designed to discriminate
between those who will succeed and fail on parole. 0 5 In developing
the Salient Factor Score, researchers attempted to isolate the factors
that best discriminated between those who would succeed and those
who would fail on parole. 08 Nine characteristics were determined to
be of value in making parole prognosis. After further testing, the pre-
dictive power of the Salient Factor Score was believed sufficient to
recommend implementation.10 7 Of the nine characteristics found to be
of predictive value, not one referred to the severity of the harm caused
by the offender. 08 In other words, severity of harm was not found to
predict recidivism. If severity of harm is not correlated with recidivism,
then extending the length of imprisonment based solely upon the harm
done cannot be justified on grounds of insuring "the public safety by
preventing the commission of offenses through... the rehabilitation of
those convicted and their confinement when required in the interests of
public protection."' 0 9
The Parole Board's work does not dispose of the issue entirely. The
Board was not directly interested in the relationship between harm and
103. For a discussion of the Guidelines Offense Severity Index, and of the me-
chanics of the Guidelines, see Project, supra note 101, at 822-928. The Guidelines are
published in 28 C.F.R. §§ 2.1-.57 (1974).
104. See P. Hoffman & J. Beck, Parole Decision-Making: A Salient Factor Score,
Apr. 1974 (U.S. Bd. of Parole Res. Unit: Rep. 2).
105. Id. at 2-3. "Failure" was defined as a new conviction resulting in a sentence
of at least 60 days, a return to prison for parole violation, or an outstanding warrant.
Id.
106. Id. at 13.
107. Id.
108. The Salient Factors are: (1) number of prior incarcerations; (2) age at first
commitment; (3) whether the crime involved auto theft; (4) prior negative experi-
ence on parole or probation; (5) history of drug abuse; (6) high school degree or
equivalent; (7) verified private employment or full time school attendance for at least
six months in last two years in community; (8) number of prior convictions; (9) and
release plan to live with spouse or children. 28 C.F.R. § 2.20, at 73 (1974).
Due to the other component of the Guidelines-the Offense Severity Scale-there
is a relationship between the subjective severity of the crime and length of time served.
The Offense Severity Scale is not part of the Guidelines because of its predictive value;
rather, its function is to accommodate the Guidelines to the subjective evaluations of
the seriousness of offenses that are held by Parole Board members. P. Hoffman, J.
Beck & L. DeGostin, The Practical Application of a Severity Scale, June 1973 (NCCD
Parole Decision-Making Project Supp. Rep. 13).
109. N.Y. PENAL LAw § 1.05(5) (McKinney 1975).
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recidivism-the scope of the study was much broader. 10 Furthermore,
the mere fact that the Parole Board does not think severity of harm
indicates the likelihood of recidivism does not prove the two are un-
related. Clearly, the importance of the Board's work lies not in what it
proves, but in what it suggests-which is that the principle of aggra-
vated harm cannot be justified on the grounds of incapacitation or
treatment of likely recidivists."'
The clinical attempts to predict violent criminality support the
position that severity of harm is not related to the chance of recidivat-
ing, though admittedly the corroboration is weak. The efforts of the
clinicians have been directed towards developing techniques that allow
valid predictions of future violent criminality to be made. The one
point on which all agree is that it is difficult, if not impossible, to pre-
110. There may be some who would argue that the breadth of the study makes it
of little value in determining a much narrower issue-that often too much knowledge
is worse than too little. Cf. Dershowitz, Preventive Disbarment: The Numbers are
Against It, 58 A.B.A.J. 815, 819 (1972).
111. California has engaged in a similar attempt at parole prediction. The Cali-
fornia Youth and Adult Corrections Agency employs a base expedtancy table composed
of twelve factors to predict the likelihood of success on parole. As with the U.S. Board
of Parole's Salient Factor Score, the California base expectancy table does not include
any reference to the harm done by the individual. See McGee, Objectivity in Predict-
ing Criminal Behavior, 42 F.R.D. 192 (1968).
Yet another attempt at predicting parole success comprises part of the work of the
Patuxent Institution of Maryland. Created by statute, the Defective Delinquent Act, MD.
ANN. CODE art. 31B, § 5 (1951), one of the institutional purposes is to confine and
treat "defective delinquents." "Defective delinquent" is defined as an individual "who,
by the demonstration of persistent aggravated antisocial or criminal behavior evidences
a propensity toward criminal activity, and who is found to have either such intellectual
deficiency or emotional imbalance, or both, as to clearly demonstrate an actual danger
to society." Id. at § 5. These individuals should be treated until such time as it is
"reasonably safe for society to terminate confinement and treatment." Id. For an account
of the operation of Patuxent, see Sas v. Maryland, 334 F.2d 506 (4th Cir. 1964); Carney,
The Indeterminate Sentence at Patuxent, 20 CRIME & DELIN. 135 (1974). Once a person
is confined to Patuxent as a defective delinquent, the institution is not to release him
until convinced that it is safe to do so. The resources at its command are described in
Director of Patuxent Institution v. Daniels, 243 Md. 16, 221 A.2d 397, cert. denied, 385
U.S. 940 (1966). Notwithstanding these resources, which allow Patuxent to engage in
therapy with patients as well as attempt to predict the chance of success on release, the
Institution has apparently not been very successful in discriminating between those who
will and will not succeed. See generally Schreiber, Indeterminate Therapeutic Incarcera-
tion of Dangerous Criminals: Perspectives and Problems, 56 VA. L. REv. 602 (1970).
But see Hodges, Crime Prevention by the Indeterminate Sentence Law, 128 Am. J.
PsYcnrAraY 291 (1971).
For a collection of other attempts at developing a predictive technology, see Project,
supra note 101, at 872 n.308. For a discussion of the best known of these-the Glueck
scale for the prediction of juvenile delinquency-see Prigmore, An Analysis of Rater
Reliability on the Glueck Scale for the Prediction of Juvenile Delinquency, 54 J. CIrM.
L.C. & P.S. 30, 31 n.11 (1963); Voss, The Predictive Efficiency of the Glueck Social
Prediction Table, 54 J. CRims. L.C. & P.S. 421 (1963).
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dict dangerousness, 112 and that the most sophisticated techniques are
called for:
Dangerousness seems to be a result of multiple forces. It cannot
be attributed to a single factor, and it is not detectable through




Although the clinical studies did not examine the specific relationship
of severity of harm and recidivism, and were concerned with predicting
one relatively rare species of recidivism, still they do imply that the
relationship between the two, given present knowledge," 4 is inadequate
to justify increased periods of imprisonment on the basis of harm if
the purpose to be served is incapacitation or rehabilitation."5
That severity of harm is irrelevant to the determination of a sen-
tence imposed for purposes of rehabilitation and incapacitation is not
universally accepted, however. Relying more on intuition than anal-
ysis, various commentators have defended the relevance of the prin-
ciple of aggravated harm to a determination of the. risk a person
created and thus to the determination of an appropriate sanction based,
in part, upon considerations of rehabilitation and incapacitation. 116
112. One research team has concluded that valid predictions of dangerousness can
be made. Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, The Diagnosis and Treatment of Dangerousness,
18 Cipm & DELIN. 371 (1972). Most commentators believe to the contrary. See N.
Moruos, supra note 54, at 62-73; Diamond, The Psychiatric Prediction of Dangerousness,
123 U. PA. L. Ray. 439 (1974).
113. Kozol, Boucher & Garofalo, supra note 112, at 383. For other studies of dan-
gerousness see Steadman & Halfon, The Baxstrom Patients: Backgrounds and Outcomes,
3 SEMINARS IN PSYCHIATRY 376 (1971); Steadman & Keveles, The Community Adjust-
ment and Criminal Activity of the Baxstrom Patients: 1966-1970, 129 AM. J. PsY-
cHIATRY 304 (1972); Wenk, Robison & Smith, Can Violence Be Predicted?, 18 CRuME
& DELIN. 393 (1972).
114. As I have pointed out elsewhere, our predictive capacity is most likely im-
proving, and the time may not be far away when the difficult issue of preventive de-
tention will have to be faced squarely. Allen, Book Review, 73 MIcH. L. REv. 1517, 1528
(1975).
115. This conclusion is supported by two interesting studies done by Franklin Zim-
ring in Chicago. One study compared fatality rates in knife and gun attacks. Zimring, Is
Gun Control Likely to Reduce Violent Killings?, 35 U. CH. L. REV. 721 (1968). The
other compared fatality rates in attacks with guns of various calibers. Zimring, The
Medium is the Message: Firearm Caliber as a Determinant of Death from Assault, 1
J. LEGAL STUDIEs 97 (1972). Essentially, what he found was that the fact of death re-
sulting from an assault is not a "complete" indicator of the seriousness of the assault. As
he said in the latter study, "whatever else may separate fatal from nonfatal firearm at-
tacks, the element of chance must play an important role . . . [and there] is a strong
suggestion that most people who attack with guns act in ways. that are distinguishable
only on the basis of result." Id. at 110-11.
116. See, e.g., F. ALLEN, supra note 32, at 19; Packer, The Model Penal Code and
Beyond, 63 CoLUM. L. REv. 594, 598 (1963). The Temporary Commission apparently
felt sifrilarly: "The seriousness of the crime is an indication of the public's need for
protection and of the offender's need for control." Commission Staff Notes, supra note 5,
at 276 (footnote omitted).
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Professor Schulhofer recently articulated the basis for this intuitive
judgment. In a discussion of "arguments that seek to relate actual
harm to the dangerousness of the offender or his offense, a factor that
may be relevant ... to decisions concerning the need for isolation and
treatment of the offender,"' l 7 he said:
The validity of the dangerousness theory is in one sense clear.
Suppose we group together all those whose conduct appears to have
created the same risk, so far as this risk can be estimated on the basis
of actions alone, and then divide this group into two classes-one
consisting of those who have caused harm and the other consisting
of those who have not. It is statistically inevitable that those who
have caused harm will on the average have created higher risks, in
terms of circumstances of which they should have been aware, than
those who did not cause harm. The harmful result thus . . . . con-
firms the dangerousness of conduct so difficult to evaluate that we
would otherwise be reluctant to condemn it." 8
But, this position cannot withstand analysis. More importantly, al-
though elucidating the logical error that this argument entails will not
demonstrate the empirical validity of any proposition concerning the
principle of aggravated harm, it will demonstrate that the intuitive
position cannot be maintained, thus leaving the principle of aggravated
harm without support.
Schulhofer's argument that the occurrence of harm differen-
tiates among those who created higher and lower risks, far from being
"statistically inevitable," rests upon circular reasoning-it begs the
question by assuming what is to be proved. The argument can be re-
duced to the following: if there is a class of similar but not identical
acts, X and X' being representative of the class, whose occurrence pre-
cipitates in every case either result A or result B, then it is "statis-
tically inevitable" that those who engage in act X, resulting in A, "will
on the average have created higher risks, in terms of circumstances of
which they should have been aware,"" 9 of the occurrence of A, than
those who engage in X' resulting in B. This follows, however, only
if what the argument is attempting to prove is assumed to be true-
that the occurrence of A indicates the relative chance of the occurrence
of A created by act X as compared to X'. That is, that the occurrence
of A is generally a result of an act that created a relatively higher risk
117. Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 1508.




of A, viewed from the actor's perspective, than did a similar act result-
ing in B.
That assumption, however, may be contrary to fact. Whether X
and X' cause A or B may simply be fortuitous-a matter of nothing
but chance. If that is the case, then the occurrence of A indicates only
that a chance event has occurred. It most certainly does not necessarily
indicate that the person committing act X resulting in A created a
higher chance of A than did another who engaged in X' with B the
result.120 Consider, for example, two individuals playing dice, one of
whom throws the total of six, and the other throws snake-eyes. If the
dice are evenly balanced and randomly distributed in each player's
hand before he throws, the chance of each man totaling six is the same
(as is the chance of throwing snake-eyes). The fact that the first man
totaled six does not indicate that the chance of his throwing that total
was higher than the second man's chance of throwing six; it simply
indicates that a chance event occurred. In short, Professor Schulhofer's
argument is valid only insofar as apparently similar events create dis-
parate risks of harm, but that apparently similar events do create dif-
ferent risks of harm cannot be demonstrated as he attempts to do so.' 12
Thus, the principle of aggravated harm can find little support in em-
piricism or rhetoric to buttress the contention that it serves the pur-
poses of rehabilitation or incapacitation. 122
120. This is true regardless of what the chance of A occurring is. For example,
event X may result in A 80% of the time and in B 20% of the time. But, two people
engaging in X, in one case resulting in A and in the other in B, a priori create the
same risk of A: 80%.
121. But see note 80 supra. The essence of Schulhofer's logical error is a failure
to distinguish between one event being repeated an infinite number of times (e.g., throwing
one pair of dice an infinite number of times) and an infinite number of similar events,
each occurring once (e.g., throwing an infinite number of identical dice once each). This
problem may also underlie Glanville Williams' well-known statement that "a would-be
criminal who constantly fails is less dangerous than one who constantly succeeds." G.
WILLIAMS, supra note 21, at 137. The truth of this depends upon what "constantly
fails" and "constantly succeeds" mean, for, as Williams himself has said, "the danger
is the same where the criminal's failure to complete is due only to chance." Id. at 136.
See also Smith, Element of Chance in Criminal Liability, 1971 Cams. L. REv. 63, 72.
122. Prof. Schulhofer asserts that "it is relevant to the grading of the offenses
that those who did not cause harm had, as a class, created lower risks than those who did
cause harm." Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 1589. He does not elaborate upon this as-
sertion, however. In fact, he later seems to contradict himself: "Harm may, of course, be
taken as an indication of the 'objective' dangerousness of the act itself, but it proves a
very crude guide for this purpose, . . . and the dangerousness of the act is in turn only





The path that we have travelled in our examination of the rela-
tionship of the principle of aggravated harm and the legitimized
justifications of punishment-deterrence, rehabilitation, and incapaci-
tation-leads inescapably to the conclusion that none of the three
adequately supports the principle, although an unadorned theory of
retaliation does. This is not to say that the New York Legislature was
embracing a retributive philosophy. 123 Perhaps it was simply follow-
123. Whether retribution ought to play a role in the criminal law is much dis-
puted. In fact, the dispute has reached constitutional proportions. Furman v. Georgia,
408 U.S. 238 (1972). Compare 408 U.S. at 342-46 (Marshall, J., concurring) with
408 U.S. at 431 (Powell, J., dissenting).
The ways by which retribution has been defended are almost as rich as the litera-
ture is vast. See authorities cited in notes 19, 32, 47, 48 supra; Mabbott, Freewill and
Punishment, in CONTEMPORARY BrTISH PHILOSOPHY, 3RD SERIES 289, 303 (H. Lewis
ed., 2d ed. 1961):
It is often thought that . . . the reform theory, is modem and humane
compared with the retributive theory, which is primitive and barbaric. But the
essential point about retributive punishment is that it treats the criminal as
a man.... To be punished for reform reasons is to be treated like a dog. A
sane adult demands to be held responsible for his actions.
Retributive punishment has been rejected by just as many, if not more, illustrious
individuals as have embraced it. See authorities cited in notes 32, 41, 60 supra. See also
AMERICAN CORRECTIONAL ASSOCIATION, MANUAL OF CORRECTIONAL STANDARDS 7-10
(3rd ed. 1966); 0. HOLMES, THE COaMsON LAw 42-46 (1881); J. MICHAEL & H.
WECHSLER, supra note 35, at 10-20; H. PACKER, supra note 19, at 37-39.
The desire to rehabilitate rather than punish offenders has provided an important
basis for rejecting retributive punishment. See K. MENNINGER, THE CRIME OF PUNISH-
MENT (1966); B. WooroN, supra note 32; Weihofen, supra note 45., In fact,
one can find preachers, if not practitioners, of rehabilitation as long ago as 1870. Ac-
cording to Jessica Mitford, the first Congress of the National Prison Association (now
the American Correctional Association), meeting in 1870, passed a Declaration of
Principles that contained, among other things, "the objective of 'moral regeneration' of
the prisoner as opposed to 'infliction of vindicative suffering."' J. MITFORD, KIND AND
USUAL PUNISHMENT 33 (1973). This is not all that surprising in light of the fact that
the present-day penitentiary is largely the result of 18th century reforms of the Penn-
sylvania Quakers who desired to substitute repentence and spiritual uplifting for the
brutal treatment then accorded offenders. A secure place was needed for this, of course,
both'to keep those in need of change in and those who would be bad influences on the
offenders out. Thus, the Walnut Street Jail of Philadelphia was opened in 1790-for
all practical purposes, the first penitentiary. See N. MoRRIs, supra note 54, at 3-5.
Finally, the work of H.L.A. Hart deserves mention. Hart's major contribution has
been his attempt to reconcile the demands of justice with the expediency of utilitarianism.
In large part this has been an attempt to demonstrate that the restrictions on punish-
ment that inhere in retribution, such as the limitation of punishment to an offender for
his offense, may also be embraced by utilitarianism. As he describes much of his own
work: "A central theme of these essays is that it is not only within the framework of a
retributive theory of punishment that insistence on the importance of these restrictions
make sense; there are important reasons, both moral and prudential, for adhering to these
restrictions which are perfectly consistent with a general utilitarian conception of the
aim of punishment." H.L.A. HART, supra note 1, at 210. For an excellent collection
of essays on the problems punishment raises, see THE PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT,
supra note 32.
In the final analysis, when all inferences and reliance on "objective fact" are recog-
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ing the advice of Justice Holmes that the law "should correspond with
the actual feelings and demands of the community, whether right or
wrong"' 24 by deferring to an "obstinate sense of a difference"' 25 held
by the public 28 between similar acts with disparate results. This may
have been done not solely out of a desire to "satisfy the craving [for
revenge] ... and thus avoid the greater evil of private retribution,"'' 27
but also in an attempt to avoid nullification of the law by officials and
juries. Just as a failure to punish transgressors may lead to vengeance
being satisfied outside the law, so too may penalties that are seen as
too harsh lead to failures to prosecute or to convict. 28 A legislature that
defers to popular retributive demands such as these does not necessarily
adopt a retributive philosophy.12 9 Still, whether the New York Legis-
lature was embracing or deferring, the practical consequences are the
same-retributive principles have been codified.
nized for what they are, I think it clear that Brett's characterization of Kant's philoso-
phy of punishment-that it "is an intuitive one, with which one can only either agree
or disagree in the light of one's own intuitions. Other formulations of the retributive
theory are likewise intuitive, and occasionally they take on a somewhat mystical tinge"-
is an apt characterization of all philosophies of punishment. P. BRETT, AN INQUIRY INTO
CRIMINAL GUILT 51 (1963), cited in G. Dix & M. SHARLOT, CRIMINAL LAW: CASES AND
MATERIALS 221 (1973). This, of course, is largely a result of a rather obvious, but
often overlooked, aspect of logical thought-all logical systems ultimately rest on as-
sumptions and definitions ("intuition," or 'moral judgments," if you will). See Mab-
bott, Prof. Flew on Punishment, in PHILOSOPHY OF PUNISHMENT, supra note 32, at 115,
120.
124. 0. HOLMES, supra note 123, at 41. Not everyone concurs with Justice Holmes'
"first requirement of a sound body of law," however. See H. WEIHOFEN, supra note 45,
at 120; Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 1514.
125. H.L.A. HART & A. HONORE, CAUSATION IN THE LAW 355 (1959).
126. Whether the public in fact does have retributive desires is disputed by some,
see note 45 supra, although there is a general consensus, not empirically validated to be
sure, that it does. See MODEL PENAL CODE art. 5, Comment at 25 (Tent. Draft No. 10,
1960); F. ALLEN, supra note 32, at 50, 71; 0. HOLMES, supra note 123, at 40; Smith,
supra note 121.
127. 0. HOLMES, supra note 123, at 41-42.
128. J. HALL, THEFT, LAW AND SoCIETY 96-101 (1935); H. KALVEN & H.
ZEISEL, THE AMERICAN JURY (1966); Levine, The New York Penal Law: A Prose-
cutor's Evaluation, 18 BUFFALO L. REv. 269, 273 (1968-69); MICHAEL & WECHSLER,
supra note 19, at 1267-68; Comment, The Fallacy and Fortuity of Motor Vehicle Homi-
cides, 41 NEB. L. REv. 793 (1962).
129. As Michael and Wechsler put it:
It may be true that the basis of the greater popular indignation when the result
occurs than when it does not, the two instances of behavior being in all signifi-
cant respects the same, is popular acceptance of the propriety of retaliation for
the harm done. The psychology of the matter may, on the other hand, be more
complicated than that. But even if it is not, the legislator or judge who takes
account of the state of public sentiment as a means to avoiding nullification
does not thereby embrace the popular theory.
MICHAEL & WECHSLER, supra note 19, at 1295 n.80. See also MODEL PENAL CODE
§2.03, Comment at 134 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1955).
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This is also true of the justification of the principle that emerges
from the conjoining of the Benthamite principle of frugality,180 a recog-
nition of our present lack of knowledge regarding the efficacy and
necessity of particular sanctions,181 and the "ideology of freedom"' 82
that our society is founded upon. In deciding how to sanction indi-
viduals who have committed similar acts but with different results, if
doubts exist whether a more or less punitive scheme best achieves the
goals of punishment, the less punitive scheme may be adopted in order
to maximize the personal freedom of the citizenry. 88 But, when this
is done through the use of the principle of aggravated harm, freedom
is maximized by way of codification of retributive principles. 184
I must say, however, that it is one thing to analyze a body of law
"[iln an illusory atmosphere of complete rationality,' 188 but quite an-
other to offer viable alternatives for the inconsistencies that are found.
Here the issue is not only theoretical symmetry and technical feasi-
130. J. BENTHAM, supra note 66, at 170 (footnote omitted):
The general object which all laws have, or ought to have, in common, is to
augment the total happiness of the community; and therefore, . . to exclude,
as far as may be... mischief.
But all punishment is mischief: all punishment in itself is evil. Upon the
principle of utility, if it ought at all to be admitted, it ought only to be ad-
mitted in as far as it promises to exclude some greater evil.
See also id. at 194.
131. See notes 61-65, 99-115 supra & accompanying text.
132. Ryu, Contemporary Problems of Criminal Attempts, 32 N.Y.U.L. REv. 1170,
1174 (1957); Ryu, supra note 87, at 796-97.
133. Maximizing freedom in this manner may run afoul of another important tenet
of our society-the principle of equality. See MICHAEL & WEOHSLER, supra note 19, at
1297-98; Schulhofer, supra note 33, at 1562-85.
134. Freedom could have been maximized and reliance on retributive principles
minimized, had the Legislature completely rejected the principle of aggravated harm and
ielated penalties to factors subject to the control of the actor. For example, rather than
let the distinction between grand and petty larceny rest solely on market values, the
Legislature could additionally require knowledge or intent as to value. This could be done
by defining grand larceny as the knowing or intentional taking of another's property of
a value of more than $250. Moreover, sequences of statutes of this sort are by no means
alien to the Penal Law. Compare the following sequences of sections: § 150.15 to
§ 150.20 (second and first degree arson); § 175.05 to § 175.10 (second and first degree
falsifying business records); § 175.30 to § 175.35 (second and first degree offering a
false instrument for filing) ; § 200.10 to § 200.12 (second and first degree bribe receiv-
ing); § 200.20 to § 200.22 (second and first degree rewarding official misconduct);
§ 200.25 to § 200.27 (second and first degree receiving reward for official misconduct);
§ 205.20 to § 205.25 (second and first degree promoting of prison contraband);
§ 220.06 to § 220.09 to § 220.18 to § 220.21 (criminal possession of a controlled sub-
stance in the sixth, fifth, second and first degrees); § 220.16 to § 220.18 (third and
second degree criminal possession of a controlled substance) ; § 220.39 to § 220.43 (third
and first degree criminal sale of a controlled substance); § 235.05 to § 235.06 (second
and first degree obscenity). N.Y. PENAL LAW (McKinney 1975).




bility, but political practicality as well.1 6 A penal law must reconcile
the often inconsistent demands of the people it affects as well as the
various theories of punishment. The New York Penal Law may be a
compromise among these various demands and theories that recognizes
"that there must be an element of retribution or expiation in punish-
ment: but that so long as that element is there, and enough of it is
there, there is everything to be said for giving the punishment the
shape that is most likely to deter and reform."' 3 7 Nevertheless, the only
satisfactory explanation of the principle of aggravated harm is that it
serves to satisfy retributive notions of punishment.
136. Thus, for example, the principle of aggravated harm, and its concomitant
punishment ranges, facilitates plea bargaining. Judge Sobel raises this issue, although in
a different context, in his article, supra note 5, at 259. It is clear that the principle of
aggravated harm was, to some extent, employed because the Commission thought the
Legislature would demand it. Consider the following portion of an interview with
Richard Denzer, The Executive Director of the Commission, discussing the felony mur-
der rule, found at note 29 supra:
[Interviewer]: Did you ever consider abolishing the felony murder rule en-
tirely?
Denzer: During the initial discussions of the Commission, some thought it
might be a good idea. However, the majority of the Commission thought
otherwise.
[Interviewer]: Who deserves the greater penalty-a man who is part of an
accident during a robbery or a man who goes out and intends to commit a
murder?
Denzer: Now you're raising a philosophical problem, that is, how much of a
part should result play in determining the punishment for a crime .... [W]e
tried to be realistic in terms of what the community was ready to accept.
Therefore, we struck a balance and permitted the result to play its part.
[Interviewer]: What do you mean by "community"? Not the man on the
street who has never heard of the felony murder rule?
Denzer: The Legislature of New York....
This conversation is reported in Schwartz & Skolnick, Drafting a New Penal Law for
New York: An Interview with Richard Denzer, 18 BUFFALO L. Rav. 251, 260-61
(1968-69).
137. Asquith, The Problem of Punishment, THE LISTENER, May 11, 1950, at 821,
quoted in J. HALL, supra note 21, at 304 n.26.
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